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The precise jurisdictions and fields of operation for Congress and the
President will always elude us.
—Louis Fisher, Constitutional Conflicts Between Congress and the
President1

I. Introduction
The murky demarcations between congressional and presidential
authority instigate many heavyweight bouts over the bounds of legislative
and executive power.2 The struggle for dominance between Congress and
the President has produced yet another herculean clash.3 The issue
confronted by this Note is whether Congress violates the separation of
powers doctrine4 by retaining virtually all control, except for the removal
1. LOUIS FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS BETWEEN CONGRESS AND THE
PRESIDENT 291 (5th ed., rev. 2007).
2. See id. at 12 ("[T]he imbalance between President and Congress is chronic and
permanent."); see also M. Elizabeth Magill, The Real Separation in Separation of Powers
Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 1127, 1128–29 (2000) ("[W]e cannot seem to solve the problem of
separation of powers. We are not even close. We do not agree on what the principle
requires, what its objectives are, or how it does or could accomplish its objectives.").
3. See MILLER CTR. OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, UNIV. OF VA., THE SEPARATION OF P OWERS:
THE ROLES OF INDEPENDENT COUNSELS, INSPECTORS GENERAL, EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE AND
EXECUTIVE ORDERS 1 (1998), available at http://web1.millercenter.org/commissions/comm
_1998.pdf ("Many gray areas remain . . . where the delineation of powers is not so clear and
where, in fact, the branches of government, usually the legislative and executive, grapple
from time to time for dominance."). For an examination of the history behind the struggle
for power between Congress and the President, see generally FISHER, supra note 1.
4. See M.J.C. VILE, CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE SEPARATION OF P OWERS 14
(Liberty Fund, Inc., 2d ed. 1998) (1967) (defining succinctly the "pure doctrine" of the
separation of powers). Vile defines the separation of powers doctrine as follows:
It is essential for the establishment and maintenance of political liberty that the
government be divided into three branches or departments, the legislature, the
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power, over the Special Inspector General for the Troubled Asset Relief
Program (SIGTARP),5 a government watchdog commissioned to supervise
the Treasury Department’s execution of Congress’s monumental economic
bailout program,6 and by requiring Treasury, an executive branch agency, to
implement recommendations from SIGTARP that are either necessary or
appropriate.
Congress’s passage of the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of
2008 (EESA)7 created an unprecedented8 $700 billion governmental bailout
scheme—the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP).9 Congress designated
SIGTARP the overseer of this bailout program, allocating to SIGTARP the
authority to recommend to Treasury certain actions with respect to Treasury’s
management of TARP funds.10 In an amendment to EESA, Congress
mandated that the executive branch must either act on these
executive, and the judiciary. To each of these three branches there is a
corresponding identifiable function of government, legislative, executive, or
judicial. Each branch of the government must be confined to the exercise of its
own function and not allowed to encroach upon the functions of the other
branches. Furthermore, the persons who compose these three agencies of
government must be kept separate and distinct, no individual being allowed to
be at the same time a member of more than one branch. In this way each of the
branches will be a check to the others and no single group of people will be able
to control the machinery of the State.
Id.; see also 1 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION 313 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds.,
Liberty Fund, Inc. 1987) ("[S]eparation [of powers] entails a clear discrimination of powers,
an independence whereby each power conducts its deliberations free of external influence,
and a dependence whereby the actions of each are subject to scrutiny and control by the
others."); infra Part V.A (surveying the Founders’ intent behind the separation of powers
principle).
5. See infra notes 40–52 and accompanying text (offering an overview of SIGTARP).
6. See Steven M. Davidoff & David Zaring, Regulation by Deal: Government’s
Response to the Financial Crisis, 61 ADMIN. L. REV. 463, 465 (2009) (stating that the federal
government’s decision to enact the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008
"mark[ed] the largest government economic intervention in history").
7. See Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, 12 U.S.C. § 5211 (2006)
[hereinafter EESA] (establishing TARP).
8. See Davidoff & Zaring, supra note 6, at 465 ("[T]he government decided, in the
course of less than a month, to create through congressional action an unprecedented $700
billion asset purchase program."); see also 155 CONG. REC. H3,848 (daily ed. Mar. 25, 2009)
(statement of Rep. Dennis Moore) (referring to EESA and stating that "[w]e stand on the
precipice of the largest infusion of government funds over the shortest period of time in our
Nation’s history" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
9. See EESA § 5211 (establishing TARP).
10. See infra notes 45–52 and accompanying text (discussing SIGTARP’s statutory
authority to supervise Treasury’s execution of TARP and to make recommendations to
Treasury with respect to TARP).
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recommendations or, in the event that the executive declines to act, explain to
Congress that no action is necessary or appropriate.11 The issue presented by
this provision is whether Congress usurps the executive’s prerogative to
control the execution of the laws, and thereby violates the separation of
powers tenet, by obliging Treasury to follow necessary or appropriate
recommendations from SIGTARP, over whom Congress has retained
significant control.12 Analysis of this issue requires an understanding of the
economic context in which EESA and its amendment were adopted.13
The crisis that led to Congress’s enactment of EESA has been called the
worst economic calamity since the Great Depression.14 This "Great
Recession,"15 as one economist calls it, has triggered the failure of major
businesses,16 a $14 trillion decline in consumer wealth,17 the largest job-loss
11. See Special Inspector General for the Troubled Asset Relief Program Act of 2009,
Pub. L. No. 111-15, sec. 4(2)(f), § 121, 123 Stat. 1603, 1604 (codified at 12 U.S.C.
§ 5231(f)) [hereinafter SIGTARP Act] (requiring that the Treasury Secretary must "certify"
to Congress that no action is necessary or appropriate when the Secretary elects not to heed
SIGTARP’s recommendations).
12. See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 727 (1986) ("The dangers of congressional
usurpation of Executive Branch functions have long been recognized.").
13. See generally Davidoff & Zaring, supra note 6. Davidoff and Zaring "evaluate the
government’s response to the crisis through a blow-by-blow, or historical, account." Id. at
470.
14. See Three Top Economists Agree 2009 Worst Financial Crisis Since Great
Depression; Risks Increase if Right Steps Are Not Taken, REUTERS, Feb. 27, 2009,
http://www.reuters.com/article/pressRelease/idUS193520+27-Feb-2009+BW20090227 (last
visited Feb. 16, 2011) [hereinafter Three Top Economists] ("Nouriel Roubini, professor of
economics and international business at New York University, Kenneth Rogoff, professor of
economics and public policy at Harvard University, and Nariman Behravesh, chief
economist and executive vice president for HIS Global Insight, all agreed that this is the
worst financial crisis since the Great Depression.") (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review). Rogoff described the current financial crisis as "a once in a 50-year event."
Id.; see also Press Release, Barack Obama, President of the United States, Remarks by the
President on 21st Century Financial Regulatory Reform (June 17, 2009),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-of-the-President-on-Regulatory-Reform/
(last visited Feb. 16, 2011) (referring to the current market catastrophe as "a historic
economic crisis") (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
15. See Three Top Economists, supra note 14 (observing that Behravesh dubbed the
crisis the "Great Recession").
16. See Carrick Mollenkamp et al., Lehman Files for Bankruptcy, Merrill Sold, AIG
Seeks Cash, WALL ST. J., Sept. 16, 2008, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB
122145492097035549.html (observing that the "American financial system was shaken to its
core" by the failure of prominent U.S. businesses such as Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc.,
Merrill Lynch & Co., Bear Stearns Cos., Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie
Mae), and Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac)) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
17. See MARTIN NEIL BAILY & DOUGLAS J. ELLIOTT, INITIATIVE ON BUS. & PUB.

380

68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 375 (2011)

episode since the World War II era,18 and historic collapses in the banking,
credit, and housing markets.19 The federal government responded to this
market catastrophe by forcing the sale of prominent businesses and by
seizing the reins of other renowned companies that had buckled under the
pressure of this economic landslide.20
After this unprecedented
POLICY AT BROOKINGS, THE US FINANCIAL AND
AND WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?

ECONOMIC CRISIS: WHERE DOES IT STAND
7 (2009), available at http://www.
brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/2009/0615_economic_crisis_baily_elliott/0615_econ
omic_crisis_baily_elliott.pdf ("Households lost $13 trillion of wealth from the peak through
the end of 2008 . . . [and lost] another $1.33 trillion . . . in the first quarter of 2009 . . . .").
18. See Timothy R. Homan, Job Losses in U.S. Slow as Unemployment Climbs to
26-Year High, BLOOMBERG, Sept. 5, 2009, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=
newsarchive&sid=aVmZJLQoKv2g (last visited Feb. 16, 2011) ("The latest numbers
brought total jobs lost since the recession began in December 2007 to 6.9 million, the
biggest decline in any post-World War II economic slump.") (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review). The 9.7% unemployment rate, as of July 2009, is the highest in
twenty-six years. Id.
19. See BAILY & ELLIOTT, supra note 17, at 5–7 ("Declines in the real economy
exacerbated the problems of financial institutions, which then created a credit crunch
hurting the real economy . . . . [T]here was a decline [in home-construction] of over 38
percent in the first quarter of 2009 at an annual rate.").
20. See Lawrence A. Cunningham & David Zaring, The Three or Four Approaches
to Financial Regulation: A Cautionary Analysis Against Exuberance in Crisis Response,
78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 39, 56–72 (2009) (examining the federal government’s
extraordinary "on-the-fly" response to the 2008 market crisis); Steven Pearse, Note,
Accounting for the Lack of Accountability: The Great Depression Meets the Great
Recession, 37 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 409, 421 (2010) ("To prevent a complete collapse of
all of these financial institutions and avoid a total breakdown of the American economy,
the Executive Branch took quick and decisive action to bail these companies out of their
self-inflicted financial crisis." (footnote omitted)); see also Davidoff & Zaring, supra note
6, at 466 ("As the crisis developed, the government forced the sales of one of the five
largest investment banks, the largest thrift in the country, and a number of consumer
banks." (footnote omitted)). "[The government] permitted an even larger investment bank
and another of the country’s largest thrifts to fail." Id. "The government also took over
the country’s largest insurer and nationalized . . . two government-sponsored enterprises
that mortally suffered from the popping of the housing bubble." Id.
According to Davidoff and Zaring, the "first hints of public trouble in the credit
markets began to emerge from the subprime mortgage market in April 2007." Id. at
471. The federal government’s unprecedented involvement as a facilitator of private
deals began with the downfall of Bear Stearns in May 2008. See id. at 473–77
(detailing the series of events that preceded Bear’s collapse); Charles K. Whitehead,
Reframing Financial Regulation 22–23 (Cornell Law Sch. Legal Studies Research
Paper Series, Paper No. 09-026, 2009), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1447424 (last visited
Feb. 16, 2011) (same) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
Immediately before Bear would have been forced to declare bankruptcy, the
government pressured JPMorgan into acquiring Bear Stearns and squeezed J.C.
Flowers, another of Bear’s suitors, out of the deal. See Davidoff & Zaring, supra note
6, at 479–80 ("Treasury pushed JPMorgan to offer as low a price as possible for
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governmental involvement failed to stave off further financial devastation,
the government abandoned its previous plan and adopted a new strategy—
massive "emergency legislation."21 And out of this emergency legislation
was born EESA and, with it, a dramatic expansion of governmental
power.22
As the smoke clears from this display of government action, it
becomes evident that EESA was enacted with "all the hallmarks of
emergency."23 When government reacts hurriedly to a monumental crisis,24
Bear . . . . The chastened investment bank took the deal." (footnotes omitted)).
In July 2008, the Office of Thrift Supervision seized IndyMac Bank, resulting in the
second-largest bank failure in U.S. history. Id. at 485. Congress then passed the Housing
and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 (HERA), 12 U.S.C. § 4501, providing "$300 billion in
aid to subprime housing buyers." Id. at 484–85. After nationalizing Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac in September 2008, id. at 486, the government watched as Lehman Brothers
filed for bankruptcy and as Merrill Lynch was acquired by Bank of America. Id. at 493–94.
The Federal Reserve then nationalized American International Group (AIG), committing
$182.5 billion to the bailout scheme. Id. at 499; see Whitehead, supra, at 23, 30–36
(recounting AIG’s financial downfall and the federal government’s subsequent takeover of
the company). The FDIC then seized the assets of Washington Mutual and sold them to
JPMorgan without informing the leadership of Washington Mutual. Davidoff & Zaring,
supra note 6, at 508. Wachovia was the next target of the FDIC, which facilitated the sale of
the company to Wells Fargo. Id. at 509. The final "pre-EESA episode of government as
dealmaker" transpired in October 2008, when the government facilitated the rescue of
Morgan Stanley. Id. at 511–12.
21. See Davidoff & Zaring, supra note 6, at 464–65 ("When the real estate bubble
popped, with catastrophic implications for the financial institutions that facilitated property
purchases, the credit market, and, eventually, all of the participants in the worldwide
financial system, the federal government reacted slowly, and then uncertainly, and finally on
an emergency and massive basis."); id. at 512–13 ("Clearly, the government’s ad hoc
strategy was failing and a greater response was needed . . . . The result was a turn away
from the deal-to-deal approach and toward Congress.").
22. See id. at 523 ("The bailout statute represented a dramatic expansion of the
government powers to enter the financial markets, but it also represented a massive grant of
flexibility to the Treasury Department, accompanied by hundreds of billions of authorized
dollars. That the authorization was unprecedented is perhaps obvious.").
23. See id. at 513 ("The text of the first draft of the bailout bill submitted to Congress
came from the Treasury Department on September 20, [2008,] with all the hallmarks of
emergency; there has never been a shorter draft statute that would have committed such a
large amount of money."). The initial draft of EESA "did not provide for judicial review of
anything [the Treasury] Department did." Id. at 515. Congress rejected this initial draft on
September 29. Id. at 518. However, in the wake of EESA’s initial defeat, the stock market
continued to fold. Id. Spurred by the increasingly fierce economic crisis, Congress altered
and expanded the bill and "quickly passed the amended statute on October 4." Id. The
bailout bill "had grown from 3 pages in length to 451 pages in length in less than two
weeks." Id.
24. See id. at 475 ("The government’s actions [during this economic crisis] were
reactive rather than proactive.").
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a fair inquiry is whether its action is faithful to constitutional norms, or
whether some vital principle falls by the wayside and is sacrificed to
apparent necessity.25
Here, the forgotten principle is the separation of powers doctrine.26
Because the Founding Fathers viewed the separation of powers as the
keystone of sound government,27 this principle has been upheld even when
both the executive and the legislative branches have ignored it in the name
of expediency.28 This Note analyzes whether the separation of powers
25. See TOM CAMPBELL, SEPARATION OF POWERS IN PRACTICE 24 (2004) ("The
legislature tends to be nondeliberative."). "The major disadvantage of the legislative branch
is that, despite the oath requirement of the U.S. Constitution, . . . legislators have strong
incentives to ignore constitutional requirements that are not popular." Id. "The legislature’s
ability to shift quickly can lead to inconsistency and uncertainty . . . ." Id.
26. See supra note 4 (defining the separation of powers principle); infra Part V.A
(discussing the underpinnings of the separation of powers and explaining the critical
importance of preserving this principle).
27. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 119 (1976) (recognizing "the importance
of the doctrine of separation of powers which is at the heart of our Constitution");
Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 629 (1935) ("The fundamental necessity of
maintaining each of the three general departments of government entirely free from the
control or coercive influence, direct or indirect, of either of the others, has often been
stressed and is hardly open to serious question."); THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, at 336 (James
Madison) (Benjamin Fletcher Wright ed., Belknap Press of Harvard University Press 1961)
("No political truth is certainly of greater intrinsic value, or is stamped with the authority of
more enlightened patrons of liberty, than [the separation of powers principle]. The
accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands, . . . may
justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny."); see also ANDREW M. ALLISON ET AL.,
THE REAL THOMAS JEFFERSON 622 (2d ed., rev. 1983) (quoting Thomas Jefferson as stating
that the "first principle of a good government is, certainly, a distribution of its powers into
executive, judiciary, and legislative, and a subdivision of the latter into two or three
branches" (quoting 4 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 454 (Paul Leicester Ford ed.,
1898))).
28. See Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 944 (1983)
("[T]he fact that a given law or procedure is efficient, convenient, and useful in facilitating
functions of government, standing alone, will not save it if it is contrary to the
Constitution."). In Chadha, the Court invalidated a statute’s one-House congressional veto
provision as violative of the separation of powers principle. Id. at 959. The one-House
legislative veto contravened both the constitutional requirement that all legislative action
must traverse both Houses of Congress (the bicameralism principle) and the constitutional
requirement that all legislation must be presented to the President before becoming law (the
Presentment Clauses). Id. at 945–59. Both the executive and the legislative branches
acquiesced to this legislative veto for efficiency and expediency reasons. See Louis Fisher,
Micromanagement by Congress: Reality and Mythology, in THE FETTERED PRESIDENCY:
LEGAL CONSTRAINTS ON THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH 147 (L. Gordon Crovitz & Jeremy A.
Rabkin eds., 1989) (observing that the legislative veto arose as a mutually beneficial pact
between the executive and legislative branches, "a simple quid pro quo that allowed the
executive branch to make law without any legislative action but gave Congress the right to
recapture control without having to pass another public law"). In Chadha, the Court noted
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principle has survived the government’s rush to address the economic
downturn.29
However, the implications of this Note reach beyond EESA, its
amendment, and SIGTARP. Experts portend more uncertainty in the
market, the possibility of future crises,30 and the likelihood of more
emergency legislation.31 Just as Congress resorted to "novel efforts" by
enacting EESA and its amendment,32 future problems may produce
that, from 1932 until the Court’s 1983 decision in Chadha, 295 similar congressional veto
procedures had been enacted by statutes. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 944. However, the Court
found that neither the frequency of nor the convenience offered by these congressional veto
provisions justified undercutting the separation of powers principle. Id. at 944–45. The
Court stated:
Convenience and efficiency are not the primary objectives—or the hallmarksof democratic government and our inquiry is sharpened rather than blunted by
the fact that Congressional veto provisions are appearing with increasing
frequency in statutes . . . .
Justice White undertakes to make a case for the proposition that the oneHouse veto is a useful "political invention," and we need not challenge that
assertion . . . .
But policy arguments supporting even useful "political
inventions" are subject to the demands of the Constitution which defines powers
and, with respect to this subject, sets out just how those powers are to be
exercised.
Id. (citations omitted).
29. See Pearse, supra note 20, at 411 (contending that, although the federal
government’s massive bailout program granted "quick relief" to the American people, the
"Constitution has seemingly been undermined" in the process).
30. See BAILY & ELLIOTT, supra note 17, at 2–3 ("We fear that the . . . reactions of the
financial markets and . . . analysts carry too much . . . optimism without recognizing enough
of the uncertainty . . . . [T]here is still [much] uncertainty about when the recession will end,
when growth will recover or whether the financial sector is firmly on the road to recovery.").
"Uncertainty about Congressional authorization of additional funds could create panic in the
markets and exacerbate a future stage of crisis." Id. at 23.
31. See Davidoff & Zaring, supra note 6, at 532 (outlining the pattern of governmental
response to crises). Davidoff and Zaring state:
Government responses to crises have their own pattern . . . . The response often
begins with the scramble of governments to keep up with fast-paced and
deleterious market events, leading to an initial, ad hoc phase in government
action, where emergencies are responded to with emergency-style rules and
emergency-style process. In sufficiently serious crises, the next phase may be a
legislative one—beginning with outraged congressional hearings and then new
legislative authority . . . . Finally, there is reform; either reform forgone in favor
of blue-ribbon commissions and minor regulatory reorganization, or reform
embraced by new legislation and a restructuring of the financial regulatory
system.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
32. See id. at 466 (discussing the government’s "novel efforts during [this] financial
crisis").
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additional legislative experimentation.33 If the separation of powers
principle is diluted in the current economic emergency,34 its future utility is
questionable.35 Hence, because this Note contemplates the likelihood of
more bold moves by Congress in response to future emergencies, this Note
not only proposes a solution to the SIGTARP separation of powers issue,
but also recommends a time-honored principle for repelling separation of
powers attacks that may plague future crisis legislation.
With that backdrop in mind, Part II of this Note sets forth the relevant
facts underlying the separation of powers issue raised by EESA, its
amendment, and SIGTARP. Part III surveys Supreme Court precedent on
the portion of the separation of powers principle relevant to this Note and
applies this precedent to the issue presented by SIGTARP, arguing that the
separation of powers has been transgressed.
Part IV proposes a workable solution to the SIGTARP separation of
powers predicament in the form of an amendment to the problematic
statute. In addition to proffering a solution to SIGTARP’s separation of
powers problem, this Note submits a standard for resolving similar
separation of powers issues that may arise as a result of America’s
uncertain future. As America weathers the current economic storm, it
enters uncharted territory—even experts are uncertain about what lies
33. See id. at 470 (finding that the "gathering crisis pushed the government" to
abandon its initial approach and to adopt more drastic measures in an attempt to rectify the
economy).
34. See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 734 (1986) (striking down as violative of the
separation of powers principle a statute through which Congress retained removal power
over a congressional officer who exercised executive power). Confronted by "fiscal and
economic problems of unprecedented magnitude," Congress enacted the statute at issue in
Bowsher for the purpose of eliminating the federal budget deficit. Id. at 717, 736. However,
the Court found that the economic crisis did not justify violating the separation of powers
doctrine. Id. at 736. The Court stated:
No one can doubt that Congress and the President are confronted with fiscal and
economic problems of unprecedented magnitude, but "the fact that a given law
or procedure is efficient, convenient, and useful in facilitating functions of
government, standing alone, will not save it if it is contrary to the Constitution.
Convenience and efficiency are not the primary objectives—or the hallmarksof democratic government . . . ."
Id. (quoting Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 944 (1983)).
35. See Jeff Zeleny, Obama Weighs Quick Undoing of Bush Policy, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
10, 2008, at A19 (reporting that Rahm Emanuel, President Obama’s current chief of staff,
stated in an interview: "Rule one: Never allow a crisis to go to waste . . . . They are
opportunities to do big things"). Crises are often utilized as breeding grounds for longawaited changes. See Davidoff & Zaring, supra note 6, at 484 ("[T]he government used the
crisis to push for some long-cherished reform of the financial regulatory system.").
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ahead. However, as mentioned above, more crises and, thus, more bold,
sweeping legislative responses, are likely. To ensure that the separation of
powers withstands these governmental responses to future emergencies, the
often shifting Supreme Court precedent must not serve as the lone defense
against the deterioration of the separation of powers. Instead, the American
people must arise and reclaim their station as the guardians of the republic.
Part V petitions for the resurgence of this principle, explaining that the
Founders intended for the people to fulfill this critical role. Accordingly,
America must turn to the people to safeguard the separation of powers
during the uncertain times ahead.
II. The Relevant Facts Underlying the Separation of Powers Issue
Presented by SIGTARP
Congress enacted EESA in an attempt to resurrect the economy.36 The
centerpiece of EESA is TARP, which authorizes the Treasury Secretary to
purchase "troubled assets" such as residential and commercial mortgages,
related securities, and other difficult-to-sell resources.37 Although Congress
allocated only $700 billion for the purchase of troubled assets through
TARP,38 the total amount of federal funds expended in connection with
TARP could exceed $23 trillion.39
36. See EESA, Pub. L. No. 110-343, pmbl., 122 Stat. 3765, 3765 (2008) ("An Act [t]o
provide authority for the Federal Government to purchase and insure certain types of
troubled assets for the purposes of providing stability to and preventing disruption in the
economy and financial system and protecting taxpayers . . . .").
37. See EESA, 12 U.S.C. § 5211(a)(1) (2006) ("The Secretary is authorized to
establish . . . TARP . . . to purchase, and to make and fund commitments to purchase,
troubled assets from any financial institution, on such terms . . . as are determined by the
Secretary, and in accordance with this chapter and the policies and procedures developed
and published by the Secretary."); id. § 5202(9)(A)–(B) (defining "troubled assets" as
"residential or commercial mortgages and any securities, obligations, or other instruments
that are based on or related to such mortgages . . . [and] any other financial instrument that
the Secretary . . . determines the purchase of which is necessary to promote financial market
stability . . . ."); see also Gary Lawson, Burying the Constitution Under a TARP 4–5 (Boston
Univ. Sch. of Law, Working Paper No. 09-31, 2010), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1436462 (last
visited Feb. 16, 2011) (offering a brief overview of EESA and TARP) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review); id. at 6 (noting that, through EESA, Congress effectively
"empower[ed] the national government to become a gargantuan mortgage broker").
38. OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GEN. FOR THE TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF
PROGRAM, QUARTERLY REPORT TO CONGRESS 5 (Oct. 21, 2009) [hereinafter SIGTARP
QUARTERLY REPORT], available at http://www.sigtarp.gov/reports/congress/2009/October
2009_Quarterly_Report_to_ Congress.pdf.
39. In a statement before the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform
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A. Overview of TARP and SIGTARP

To ensure accountability for the use of TARP funds, Congress
established, through EESA, the Office of the Special Inspector General for
the Troubled Asset Relief Program.40 SIGTARP is appointed by the
President and confirmed by the Senate and is removable from office by the
President.41 Neil M. Barofsky42 was confirmed by the Senate to the
position of SIGTARP on December 8, 2008, and was sworn into office on
December 15, 2008.43 SIGTARP enjoys a $65 million operating budget.44
SIGTARP’s mission is to "advance economic stability by promoting
the efficiency and effectiveness of TARP management, through
transparency, through coordinated oversight, and through robust
on July 21, 2009, SIGTARP explained that, since the conception of TARP, the Treasury
Department has "created 12 separate programs involving Government and private funds of
up to almost $3 trillion." Neil Barofsky, Special Inspector Gen., Troubled Asset Relief
Program, Statement Before the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform 2
(July 21, 2009), available at http://www.sigtarp.gov/reports/testimony/2009/Testimony
_Before_the_House_Committee_on_Oversight_and_Government_Reform.pdf. However,
SIGTARP acknowledged that, "[a]s massive and as important as TARP is on its own, it is
just one part of a much broader Federal Government effort to stabilize and support the
financial system." Id. SIGTARP acknowledged that the "total potential Federal
Government support could reach up to $23.7 trillion." Id.
40. EESA § 5231; see also James C. Dugan & Scott S. Rose, TARP Enforcement:
Latest Developments and Insights, THE METROPOLITAN CORPORATE COUNSEL, June 30,
2009, http://www.metrocorpcounsel.com/current.php?artType=view&EntryNo=9881 (last
visited Feb. 16, 2011) ("Recognizing that such a large pool of funds is subject to potential
misuse, abuse, and fraud, Congress established [SIGTARP] as the chief enforcement body
overseeing TARP.") (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
41. EESA § 5231(b)(1), (4); see also Inspector General Act of 1978, 5 U.S.C. App.
§ 3(b) [hereinafter IG Act] ("An Inspector General may be removed from office by the
President. . . . [T]he President shall communicate . . . the reasons for any such removal . . .
to both Houses of Congress.").
42. Prior to his appointment as SIGTARP, Barofsky served as a federal prosecutor in
the Southern District of New York for more than eight years. About Us—The Special
Inspector General, http://www.sigtarp.gov/about_ig.shtml (last visited Feb. 16, 2011) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). During his tenure as a prosecutor, Barofsky
was a Senior Trial Counsel who chaired the Mortgage Fraud Group. Id. In addition to
prosecuting white collar crimes with the Securities and Commodities Fraud Unit, Barofsky
spearheaded the drug investigation of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, which
has been dubbed "the largest narcotics indictment filed in U.S. history." Id. Barofsky
graduated magna cum laude from New York University School of Law. Id.
43. Id. EESA provides that SIGTARP’s limited existence is coterminous with the
existence of TARP. EESA, 12 U.S.C. § 5231(k).
44. Public-Private Investment Program Improvement and Oversight Act of 2009, 12
U.S.C. § 5231a(c)(1) (increasing SIGTARP’s operating budget from $50 million to $65
million).
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enforcement against those, whether inside or outside of government, who
waste, steal or abuse TARP funds."45 SIGTARP’s primary duties46 include
auditing Treasury’s management of TARP,47 making recommendations to
Treasury with respect to TARP funds and activities,48 investigating
allegations of fraud or abuse with respect to TARP funds,49 preparing
45. SIGTARP QUARTERLY REPORT, supra note 38, at title page.
46. In addition to the duties specifically enumerated in EESA, Congress endowed
SIGTARP with the "duties and responsibilities of inspectors general" under the IG Act.
EESA § 5231(c)(3). It is not clear whether this provision of authority in EESA endows
SIGTARP with every duty and responsibility that is delineated in the IG Act or whether the
EESA provision is limited to § 4 of the IG Act, entitled "Duties and Responsibilities."
VANESSA K. BURROWS, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERV., THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL
(SIG) FOR THE TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF PROGRAM (TARP) 4 (2009), available at
www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R40099.pdf.
Section 4(a)(1) of the IG Act, which grants auditing authority, is likely not applicable to
SIGTARP because EESA contains language that grants SIGTARP’s specific auditing
authority. Compare IG Act § 4(a)(1) (delineating that it is the duty of each IG "to provide
policy direction for and to conduct, supervise, and coordinate audits and investigations
relating to the programs and operations of such establishment"), with EESA § 5231(c)(1) ("It
shall be the duty of [SIGTARP] to conduct, supervise, and coordinate audits and
investigations of the purchase, management, and sale of assets by the Secretary of the
Treasury under any program established by the Secretary . . . , and the management by the
Secretary of any program established under [EESA] . . . ."). See also BURROWS, supra, at 4
("Depending on how [EESA] is interpreted, it is possible that [SIGTARP’s] responsibilities
will not encompass § 4(a)(1) of the IG Act . . . ."). "Since the provisions creating
[SIGTARP] contain specific language with regard to conducting, supervising, and
coordinating audits and investigations, and this specific language does not mention ‘policy
direction,’ this provision of the IG Act would not seem to be included in the duties
mentioned in [§ 5231(c)(3) of EESA]." Id.
However, resolving the confusion regarding the specific extent of SIGTARP’s duties is
not the purpose of this Note.
47. See EESA § 5231(c)(1) ("It shall be the duty of [SIGTARP] to conduct, supervise,
and coordinate audits and investigations of the purchase, management, and sale of assets by
the Secretary of the Treasury under [any TARP] . . . , and the management by the Secretary
of [any TARP] . . . ."). SIGTARP is to execute these audits and investigations partly by
collecting and summarizing certain information, including information relating to the
troubled assets purchased by the Secretary through TARP, the reasons for these purchases,
the institutions from which the assets were purchased, the individuals hired to manage these
TARP assets, and the total amount of troubled assets procured by Treasury through TARP.
Id. § 5231(c)(1)(A)–(G).
48. See IG Act, 5 U.S.C. App. § 4(a)(2)–(3) (providing that an IG possesses the duty
to "review . . . legislation and regulations relating to . . . such establishment and to make
[related] recommendations . . . [and] to recommend policies for . . . [the] activities [of] such
establishment" in order to promote economy and efficiency and in order to prevent and to
detect fraud or abuse).
49. See id. § 4(a)(3) (providing that an IG possesses the power to "conduct, supervise,
or coordinate . . . activities carried out or financed by such establishment for the purpose
of . . . preventing and detecting fraud and abuse in . . . its programs and operations").
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quarterly reports for Congress on the TARP activities of both SIGTARP
and Treasury,50 and keeping Congress "fully and currently informed" on
SIGTARP’s activities.51
In the exercise of these statutory duties, SIGTARP enjoys the authority
conferred upon all other inspectors general (IG), including the power to
access all TARP-related records available to Treasury, conduct
investigations, request information and assistance from any federal or state
governmental agency, subpoena information and data, and have direct
access to the Treasury Secretary.52
B. The Clash Between SIGTARP and Treasury Regarding Treasury’s
Supervisory Authority over SIGTARP
Congress has created IGs in many executive and legislative agencies53
and has also created three special IGs: the Special Inspector General for
Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR), the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan

50. SIGTARP Act, Pub. L. No. 111-15, sec. 5(1), § 121.
51. See IG Act § 4(a)(5) (providing that an IG has the responsibility to
"keep . . . Congress fully and currently informed . . . concerning fraud and other serious
problems, abuses, and deficiencies . . . , to recommend corrective action . . . , and to report
on the progress made in implementing such corrective action").
52. EESA, 12 U.S.C. § 5231(d)(1); see also IG Act § 6(a)–(c) (detailing the authority
of IGs to execute their statutory duties).
53. See FREDERICK M. KAISER, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERV., STATUTORY OFFICES
OF INSPECTOR GENERAL: PAST AND PRESENT 1 (2008), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/
crs/misc/98-379.pdf ("Established by public law as permanent, nonpartisan independent
offices, [statutory offices of inspector general] now exist in more than 60 establishments and
entities, including all departments and largest agencies . . . ."). The four principal
responsibilities of IGs are
(1) conducting and supervising audits and investigations relating to the programs
and operations of the agency; (2) providing leadership and coordination and
recommending policies to promote the economy, efficiency, and effectiveness of
these; (3) preventing and detecting waste, fraud, and abuse in these; and
(4) keeping the agency head and Congress fully and currently informed about
problems, deficiencies, and recommended corrective action.
Id. at 1–2. Congress created IGs in an effort to spearhead a movement toward more
accountability and ethics in government. See Margaret J. Gates & Marjorie Fine Knowles,
The Inspector General Act in the Federal Government: A New Approach to Accountability,
36 ALA. L. REV. 473, 473 (1985) ("The creation of statutory, independent inspectors general
in the executive branch of the federal government represents a significant new approach to
the problem of government accountability."); see also Kathleen Clark, Toward More Ethical
Government: An Inspector General for the White House, 49 MERCER L. REV. 553, 556–60
(1998) (discussing how IGs promote an ethical environment in government).
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Reconstruction (SIGAR), and SIGTARP.54 The corresponding organic
statutes explicitly require these IGs and SIGIR and SIGAR to report to their
respective agency heads and to keep these agency heads fully and currently
informed.55 The statutes also mandate that the IGs and SIGIR and SIGAR
are to be supervised by their respective agency heads.56
In contrast to these requirements, EESA does not explicitly require
SIGTARP to report to or to be supervised by an agency head, prompting
confusion with respect to the scope of SIGTARP’s authority and freedom.57
54. BURROWS, supra note 46, at 1. Congress created SIGIR to provide for
"independent . . . audits and investigations relating to the programs and operations" of the
reconstruction of Iraq and to provide for "an independent . . . means of keeping [the
Secretaries of State and Defense] fully and currently informed about problems and
deficiencies relating to the administration of such programs and operations." See Emergency
Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense and for the Reconstruction of Iraq and
Afghanistan, 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-106, § 3001, 117 Stat. 1209, 1234–38 (establishing
SIGIR). Congress created SIGAR to provide for "independent . . . audits and investigations
relating to the programs and operations funded . . . for the reconstruction of Afghanistan"
and to provide for "an independent . . . means of keeping the [Secretaries of State and
Defense] fully and currently informed about problems and deficiencies relating to the
administration of such programs and operations." See National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-181, § 1229, 122 Stat. 3, 378–85 (establishing
SIGAR).
55. BURROWS, supra note 46, at 3; see also KAISER, supra note 53, at 2 (providing that
IGs’ reporting obligations require them to keep their respective agency heads fully and
currently informed).
56. BURROWS, supra note 46, at 3; see Gates & Knowles, supra note 53, at 489 ("The
IG . . . for each agency [is] . . . supervised by the head of the agency."); KAISER, supra note
53, at 2 ("IGs serve under the ‘general supervision’ of the agency head . . . ." (quoting IG
Act § 3(a))).
57. See BURROWS, supra note 46, at 3 ("Unlike IGs in other agencies, who shall
‘report to and be under the general supervision’ of the agency head, [SIGTARP] will not be
required to report to, or be supervised by, the head of any agency, including the Secretary of
the Treasury." (quoting IG Act § 3(a))). "[U]nder one interpretation of [SIGTARP’s] duties
and responsibilities, . . . [SIGTARP] will report only to Congress and not the agency head.
This reporting arrangement would be unique among statutory IGs." Id. (footnotes omitted).
EESA provides that SIGTARP "shall . . . have the duties and responsibilities" of IGs
pursuant to the IG Act. EESA § 5231(c)(3). However, it is not clear from this generalized
language whether the IG Act’s requirements that reference interaction with agency heads are
applicable to SIGTARP. See BURROWS, supra note 46, at 4 (noting the confusion
surrounding the issue whether SIGTARP is responsible for all of the IG duties outlined in
the IG Act, "even those that reference interaction with the head of an establishment or those
that reference responsibilities not specifically delineated in EESA").
For example, one of the "duties and responsibilities" outlined by the IG Act provides
that an IG must "keep the head of such establishment and the Congress fully and currently
informed." IG Act, 5 U.S.C. App. § 4(a)(5). In addition, while EESA requires that
SIGTARP submit reports only to Congress, EESA § 121(f)(1), the IG Act requires that IGs
submit reports both to Congress and to their respective agency heads. IG Act § 5. The
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EESA makes no explicit reference to an agency head to whom SIGTARP is
accountable and, while EESA specifically requires that SIGTARP submit
reports to Congress, EESA does not explicitly require that SIGTARP
submit reports to an agency head.58 This arrangement distinguishes
SIGTARP from all other IGs.59
In fact, even if EESA is interpreted as requiring SIGTARP to report to
or to be supervised by an agency head, it is not clear from EESA’s language
whether the Treasury Secretary is SIGTARP’s agency head or whether
SIGTARP is even part of the Treasury Department.60 This uncertainty with
inconsistencies between EESA and the IG Act spawn confusion with respect to whether
SIGTARP must also submit reports to an agency head. See BURROWS, supra note 46, at 5
("[I]t is not clear as to whether [SIGTARP] would need to submit the reports in § 5 of the IG
Act in addition to the reports required in EESA or whether [SIGTARP] would only be
responsible for the required reports set forth in EESA."); id. at 6 (observing that the
"specificity of the language of [EESA’s] report provision could be interpreted to imply that
the ‘duties and responsibilities’ provision in [EESA] § 121(c)(3) would not extend to the
reporting requirements [of] § 5 of the IG Act," which requires IGs to submit reports to
agency heads).
In addition, there is no explicit provision in EESA that the Treasury Secretary may
comment on the reports that SIGTARP prepares for Congress. See id. ("There is no explicit
requirement in EESA that the Treasury Secretary (or anyone else) be allowed to comment on
reports that [SIGTARP] submits to Congress . . . . SIGAR and SIGIR have such
requirements enabling the Secretaries of State and Defense to submit comments to the
appropriate congressional committees . . . ."); see also Diane M. Hartmus, Inspection and
Oversight in the Federal Courts: Creating an Office of Inspector General, 35 CAL. W. L.
REV. 243, 249 (1999) (observing that, although the IG Act requires agency heads to transmit
IGs’ reports to Congress unchanged, the IG Act also permits agency heads to "send
comments regarding the report directly to Congress").
Hence, "[d]ue to the ambiguous nature of the statutory language in EESA, the scope of
the powers and authorities of [SIGTARP] is not clear." BURROWS, supra note 46, at 2.
58. See generally EESA; see also id. § 121(f)(1) (requiring that SIGTARP submit
quarterly reports only to Congress); BURROWS, supra note 46, at 5 ("EESA requires
[SIGTARP] to report to Congress only, and not to an establishment head . . . .").
59. See id. at 3 (finding that SIGTARP’s reporting arrangement, as delineated by
EESA, is "unique among statutory IGs").
60. See generally EESA; see also Dugan & Rose, supra note 40 ("[I]t is unclear what
degree of control, if any, Treasury holds over SIGTARP."). However, "[i]f EESA is
interpreted to include [certain] reporting requirements . . . of the IG Act, then [SIGTARP]
could be required to submit certain reports to the establishment head, which would appear to
be the Secretary of the Treasury, as TARP itself has not been designated an establishment."
BURROWS, supra note 46, at 5; see also SIGTARP QUARTERLY REPORT, supra note 38, at 27
(stating SIGTARP’s position that SIGTARP "is an independent entity within Treasury").
Furthermore, because SIGTARP is removable by the President, EESA § 121(a)(4), and
because the power to remove is tantamount to the power to control, it seems clear, at least,
that SIGTARP is part of the executive branch. See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 720
(1986) ("Under the separation of powers established by the Framers of the Constitution, . . .
Congress may not retain the power of removal over an officer performing executive
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respect to SIGTARP’s autonomy generated thick tension between Treasury
and SIGTARP as Treasury asserted supervisory authority over SIGTARP in
April 2009 while SIGTARP stressed its independence from Treasury.61
This deadlock resulted in Treasury requesting from the Justice
Department’s Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) a legal opinion on the extent
of SIGTARP’s independence from Treasury.62 However, before OLC
responded, Treasury withdrew its request for an opinion.63 SIGTARP

functions. The congressional removal power created a ‘here-and-now subservience’ of the
Comptroller General to Congress." (citations omitted)).
61. See Dugan & Rose, supra note 40 ("Treasury recently has asserted that, under
SIGTARP’s governing statutory authority, SIGTARP is subject to Treasury’s oversight and
control . . . . SIGTARP contends that Congress’s intent, as reflected in EESA, is clearly that
SIGTARP be completely independent of Treasury."); see also Matt Jaffe, Treasury Dispute
with Bailout Watchdog Stems from AIG Bonus Audit; Now Congressman Calls for
Investigation, ABC NEWS, June 19, 2009, http://blogs.abcnews.com/politicalpunch/2009/
06/treasury-dispute-with-bailout-watchdog-stems-from-aig-bonus-audit-now-congressmancalls-for-investigation.html (last visited Feb. 16, 2011) ("The Treasury Department’s
ongoing dispute with bailout watchdog Neil Barofsky stems from the Obama
administration’s refusal in April to hand over documents relating to AIG’s executive
compensation structure . . . .") (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). In a
letter by Congressman Jeb Hensarling to Congressional Oversight Panel chair Elizabeth
Warren, Hensarling penned, "It is my understanding that this disagreement has evolved into
a debate between the Administration and SIGTARP as to whether SIGTARP is subject to the
control and supervision of the Administration." Letter from Jeb Hensarling, Deputy
Republican Whip, U.S. Cong., to Elizabeth Warren, Chair, Cong. Oversight Panel (June 19,
2009), available at http://abcnews.go.com/images/Politics/Congressman_Hensarling_
Requests_Hearings_on_SIGTARP.pdf (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
62. See SIGTARP QUARTERLY REPORT, supra note 38, at 27 ("On April 15, 2009,
Treasury asked . . . OLC for an opinion on [certain] issues pertaining to SIGTARP . . . .");
see also Evan Perez & Deborah Solomon, Treasury Retreats from Standoff with TARP
Watchdog, WALL ST. J., Sept. 3, 2009, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1251933
55469281319.html ("In April, after butting heads with Mr. Barofsky, Treasury officials
asked [OLC] for a ruling to clarify that Mr. Barofsky’s office falls under the Treasury
secretary’s supervision."). Treasury sought OLC’s legal opinion on the following issues:
(1) "whether SIGTARP is located within Treasury" and (2) "whether [SIGTARP is] subject
to the Secretary of the Treasury’s . . . general supervision." SIGTARP QUARTERLY REPORT,
supra note 38, at 27. In response to Treasury’s request, "SIGTARP made clear its position
that the language and legislative history of section 121 of EESA unambiguously provides
that SIGTARP is an independent entity within Treasury [and] that [SIGTARP] is not subject
to the Treasury Secretary’s supervision." Id.; see generally Letter from Neil M. Barofsky,
Special Inspector Gen. for the Troubled Asset Relief Program, to Bernard Knight, Jr., Acting
General Counsel, U.S. Treasury Dep’t (Apr. 7, 2009), available at
http://a.abcnews.go.com/images/Politics/SIGTARP_position_within_Treasury.pdf.
63. See SIGTARP QUARTERLY REPORT, supra note 38, at 27 ("On August 7, 2009,
Treasury withdrew its request for an OLC opinion."). "The Treasury Department declined to
explain the reason for the withdrawal of its request to the Justice Department." Perez &
Solomon, supra note 62.
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interpreted this withdrawal as "Treasury’s acknowledgement that SIGTARP
is an independent entity within Treasury, and that [SIGTARP] is not subject
to the supervision of the Treasury Secretary."64 As congressman Jeb
Hensarling asserted: "Any threat or appearance of a threat to SIGTARP’s
independence will undermine and corrupt its important mission."65
C. Treasury’s Certification Requirement
Although vague language in EESA creates serious supervisory issues
with respect to SIGTARP, EESA’s clear language poses legal questions as
well. In an amendment to EESA, Congress mandated that the Treasury
Secretary "shall . . . (1) take action to address deficiencies identified by a
report or investigation of [SIGTARP] or other auditor engaged by the
TARP; or (2) certify to appropriate committees of Congress that no action
is necessary or appropriate."66 This "certification" provision of EESA
initiates separation of powers concerns that are only exacerbated by the
uncertainty surrounding SIGTARP’s independence from Treasury.67
In the following pages, this Note endeavors to resolve this issue
pursuant to Supreme Court precedent.

64. SIGTARP QUARTERLY REPORT, supra note 38, at 27.
65. Letter from Jeb Hensarling to Elizabeth Warren, supra note 61, at 1. In a letter to
Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner, Senator Charles Grassley stated that SIGTARP was
"created by Congress as a means to combat waste, fraud, and abuse and to be [an]
independent watchdog[] ensuring" that the Treasury Department is held accountable for its
actions. Letter from Charles E. Grassley, Senator, U.S. Congress, to Timothy F. Geithner,
Secretary, U.S. Dep’t of Treasury 1 (June 17, 2009), available at http://abcnews.go.com/
images/Politics/Letter_to_Treasury090618.pdf. Furthermore, Treasury’s contention that
SIGTARP is subject to Treasury supervision could contravene congressional intent as
evidenced in EESA. See Dugan & Rose, supra note 40 (observing that Treasury’s "claim
seems contrary to Congress’s intent to charge SIGTARP with responsibility for aggressively
guarding the TARP program from fraud and abuse. In particular, a lack of independence
from Treasury could tarnish the perception that SIGTARP has the ability to do its job
effectively"); see also supra notes 55–59 and accompanying text (noting that the explicit
statutory references to agency heads’ supervisory authority over IGs and SIGIR and SIGAR
are lacking in EESA with respect to SIGTARP).
66. SIGTARP Act, Pub. L. No. 111-15, sec. 4(2)(f), § 121.
67. See Perez & Solomon, supra note 62 ("[I]n establishing [SIGTARP], Congress set
strict directives that . . . require [the Treasury Secretary] to explain if he declines to follow
any of Mr. Barofsky’s recommendations. That led to constitutional questions over whether
Congress violated the separation of powers and invaded the executive branch’s turf.").

SIGTARP AND THE EXECUTIVE-LEGISLATIVE CLASH

393

III. Analysis of SIGTARP’s Separation of Powers Issue Based on
Supreme Court Precedent
A. Supreme Court Precedent Regarding the Separation of Powers
Inconsistency pervades the Supreme Court’s decisions with respect to
the separation of powers principle.68 Although the Court has vacillated
between formalist69 and functionalist70 approaches to the separation of
68. See FISHER, supra note 1, at 287 ("The Supreme Court offers limited help in
resolving the basic disputes of separation of powers. Over the last three decades it has
bounced back and forth, sometimes embracing a functional, pragmatic approach, and at
other times adopting a doctrinaire, formalistic model."); id. at 290 (noting both the Court’s
"failure to develop a consistent and coherent theory of separated powers" and the Court’s
"record of avoiding many of the disputes between Congress and the President"); Magill,
supra note 2, at 1129 ("[T]he Supreme Court’s case law is no more settled than the
commentary: It has been called an ‘incoherent muddle,’ produced by a Court that is
‘stumped’ by separation of powers questions." (footnotes omitted)).
69. See T.J. HALSTEAD, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERV., THE SEPARATION OF
POWERS DOCTRINE: AN OVERVIEW OF ITS RATIONALE AND APPLICATION 7–8 (1999) (defining
formalism). "A formalist approach to the consideration of separation of powers issues
focuses upon the text of the Constitution in an effort to ascertain to what degree branch
powers and functions may be intermingled." Id. at 7. Because the Constitution divides
governmental power into three defined categories, "the crux of formalism is that the power
delegated to a branch should be exercised exclusively by that branch." Id. "The effect of
this approach is to ascertain whether the activity in question is judicial, executive, or
legislative in nature, and to circumscribe power which extends beyond the constitutionally
assigned functions of a particular branch." Id. at 7–8. For a further discussion of formalism,
see William N. Eskridge, Jr., Relationships Between Formalism and Functionalism in
Separation of Powers Cases, 22 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 21, 21–22 (1998), and see
generally Peter L. Strauss, Formal and Functional Approaches to Separation-of-Powers
Questions—A Foolish Inconsistency?, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 488 (1987).
70. See HALSTEAD, supra note 69, at 8 (defining functionalism). "Contrary to
formalism’s textual focus, a functionalist approach to separation of powers issues centers on
the notion that precise definitional boundaries cannot serve as a basis for the resolution of
separation of powers issues." Id. Justice Jackson propounded this functionalist premise
when he stated that "‘the actual art of governing under our Constitution does not and cannot
conform to judicial definitions of the power of any of its branches based on isolated clauses
or even single Articles torn from context.’" Id. (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.
Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring)). "Thus, a functionalist
approach permits the sharing of power between branches, concerning itself mainly with the
preservation of the core function of a particular branch where there has been no exclusive
textual commitment to a particular branch." Id. (citing Commodities Futures Trading
Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 851 (1986)). "This notion of a core function derives from
the functionalist theory that the Constitution ascribes a unique and essential power to each
branch of government, which must be protected from usurpation by the competing
branches." Id. "Branches may exercise the powers of another, so long as the ability of the
original branch to exercise such power is not impaired." Id. (citations omitted). For a
further discussion of the functionalist approach, see Eskridge, supra note 69, at 21–22, and
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powers issues it has confronted, the Court’s current precedent reveals a
proclivity for functionalism.71
see generally Strauss, supra note 69.
The functionalistic "core function" approach is generally more flexible than the
"definitional boundaries" approach espoused by the formalistic dogma. HALSTEAD, supra
note 69, at 8. Eskridge observes that "‘[s]eparation of powers’ connotes relatively formalist
inquiries of rules, deductions, and sharp lines" whereas "‘[c]hecks and balances[]’ . . .
connotes relatively functionalist inquires of standards, inductions, and flexible interactions."
Eskridge, supra note 69, at 22.
71. See FISHER, supra note 1, at 12–13 ("Between 1983 and 1986, the Court flirted
with a rigid[,] . . . impractical notion of separation of powers . . . . Although not directly
overruling those decisions, the Court in 1988 and again in 1989 issued rulings more
favorable toward the overlapping of powers, emphasizing checks and balances over a pure
separation of powers." (footnote omitted)). For an overview of the Court’s separation of
powers jurisprudence over the last three decades, see id. at 287–90.
Justice Kennedy, in a concurring opinion, sought to paint a more systematic portrait of
the Court’s separation of powers jurisprudence. See Brian C. Murchison, Interpretation and
Independence: How Judges Use the Avoidance Canon in Separation of Powers Cases, 30
GA. L. REV. 85, 135 (1995) ("At first blush, Justice Kennedy’s organization of the cases
appeared to bring a refreshing order to chaos."). In Public Citizen v. United States
Department of Justice, 491 U.S. 440 (1989), Justice Kennedy divided the Court’s separation
of powers opinions into two classes. Id. at 484–87. First, Justice Kennedy delineated cases
in which the presidential power upon which Congress was allegedly infringing "was not
explicitly assigned by the text of the Constitution to be within the sole province of the
President, but rather was thought to be encompassed within the general grant to the President
of the ‘executive power.’" Id. at 484 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1). In this line of
cases, according to Justice Kennedy, "[the Court has] employed something of a balancing
approach, asking whether the statute at issue prevents the President ‘from accomplishing
[his] constitutionally assigned functions.’" Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 695 (1988)). Justice Kennedy explicitly incorporated
Morrison into this grouping of cases, remarking that the relevant aspect of the Court’s
decision in Morrison "involved the President’s power to remove Executive officers, a
power . . . not conferred by any explicit provision in the text of the Constitution (as is the
appointment power), but rather . . . inferred to be a necessary part of the grant of the
‘executive Power.’" Id. (citing Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 115–16 (1926)).
Second, Justice Kennedy defined cases in which "the Constitution by explicit text
commits the power at issue to the exclusive control of the President." Id. at 485. When
confronted with such cases, the Court "ha[s] refused to tolerate any intrusion by the
Legislative Branch." Id.; see also Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S.
919, 999 (1983) (White, J., dissenting) ("The separation-of-powers doctrine has heretofore
led to the invalidation [by the Supreme Court] of Government action only when the
challenged action violated some express provision in the Constitution."). Justice Kennedy
observed that "[w]here a power has been committed to a particular Branch of the
Government in the text of the Constitution, the balance already has been struck by the
Constitution itself." Pub. Citizen, 491 U.S. at 486. "It is improper for this Court to arrogate
to itself the power to adjust a balance settled by the explicit terms of the Constitution . . . .
[W]here the Constitution draws a clear line, we may not engage in such tinkering." Id. at
486–87. Justice Kennedy illustrated this line of cases by identifying Immigration and
Naturalization Service v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983). Id. at 486. In Chadha, the Court
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Although the Court has not entertained a case involving the
constitutionality of IGs,72 the Court has resolved separation of powers
issues that are analogous to the issue posed by SIGTARP. In Morrison v.
Olson,73 the Court ruled that a congressionally imposed "good cause"
restriction on the President’s removal power over an independent counsel
did not "impermissibly interfer[e]" with the President’s ability to perform
his constitutional function.74
The Court reaffirmed Morrison’s
invalidated a legislative veto provision on the ground "that it violated the explicit
constitutional requirement that all legislation be presented to the President for his signature
before becoming law." Id. (citing Chadha, 462 U.S. at 946–48, 957–59).
However, Justice Kennedy brought under fire his dual-sectored structure by
transgressing it himself at the end of the same concurring opinion in which he introduced the
configuration. See Murchison, supra, at 135 ("The Kennedy concurrence, however, for all
its doctrinal strivings, was not without serious problems of its own."). After setting forth his
structure, Justice Kennedy resolved the separation of powers question at issue in Public
Citizen, which involved the President’s textually explicit appointment power, by engaging in
a form of balancing. See id. at 135–36 ("Having stated that Public Citizen involved a textual
grant of power and that balancing is ‘inapplicable,’ Justice Kennedy’s last paragraph
referred to the section of the district court’s opinion that cited Morrison and engaged in
balancing." (quoting Pub. Citizen, 491 U.S. at 487)).
72. See MILLER CTR. OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, supra note 3, at 4 (noting that IGs’ presence
in executive agencies is of "dubious constitutionality, though the issue has not been raised in
court").
73. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 697 (1988) (concluding that a "good cause"
removal provision of the Ethics in Government Act of 1978 "does not violate the separationof-powers principle by impermissibly interfering with the functions of the Executive
Branch."). In Morrison, the Court considered the constitutionality of the independent
counsel provisions of the Ethics in Government Act of 1978 (Act), 28 U.S.C. §§ 49, 591–99.
Id. at 659–60; see also Geoffrey M. McNutt, Note, Formal and Functional Approaches to
Separation of Powers: The Political Cost of Checks and Balances in Nixon v. United States
and Morrison v. Olson, 2 GEO. MASON U. L. REV. 281, 288–92 (1995) (dissecting the
Morrison opinion). The Act required the Attorney General (AG), upon receipt of relevant
information, to conduct a preliminary investigation into a supposed violation of federal
criminal law by any person implicated by the Act. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 660. If the AG
determined that "there are ‘reasonable grounds to believe that further investigation or
prosecution is warranted,’" the Act required the AG to apply to a special court created by the
Act for appointment of an independent counsel (IC). Id. at 661. If, however, the initial
investigation proved fruitless, the Act required the AG merely to notify the special court of
this result. Id. In Morrison, the Court found that the IC appointment power vested by the
Act in the special court did not contravene either Article III or the Appointments Clause of
Article II. Id. at 670–85. The Court also ruled that the Act’s "good cause" restriction on the
AG’s power to remove the IC satisfied the separation of powers because the restriction did
not "unduly trammel[]" on the President’s ability to perform his constitutional function and
did not "unduly interfer[e]" with the executive branch’s role. Id. at 685–97.
For an argument entreating the Court to overrule Morrison, see Steven G. Calabresi &
Christopher S. Yoo, Remove Morrison v. Olson, 62 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 103 (2009).
74. See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 697 (concluding that the removal restrictions do "not violate
the separation-of-powers principle by impermissibly interfering with the functions of the
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functionalist75 construction of the separation of powers doctrine in Mistretta
v. United States.76 Although the Court’s decisions embrace a functionalist
interpretation of the separation of powers, they have not overruled previous
opinions that espouse a formalist vision.77 In Bowsher v. Synar,78 one of
Executive Branch").
75. See HALSTEAD, supra note 69, at 15 (finding that the "functional approach" to
separation of powers issues "was extended in Morrison").
76. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 412 (1989) (concluding that
Congress did not violate either the nondelegation or the separation of powers doctrines by
creating the United States Sentencing Commission). In Mistretta, the Court considered the
constitutionality of the Sentencing Guidelines (Guidelines) promulgated by the United States
Sentencing Commission (Commission) pursuant to the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984
(Act), as amended, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551–3742, and 28 U.S.C. §§ 991–98. Id. at 362. The Act
established the Commission as an independent entity within the judicial branch and
delegated to the Commission the authority to craft the Guidelines, from which a sentencing
judge was able to depart only if the judge found an aggravating or mitigating factor that the
Commission did not adequately consider when formulating the Guidelines. Id. at 367–68.
In Mistretta, the Court found that the Act did not violate the nondelegation doctrine because
Congress’s assignment to the Commission of the authority to formulate the Guidelines was
accompanied by sufficiently specific instructions with respect to the Commission’s use of
that delegated authority. Id. at 371–79. The Court also concluded that the independent
structure of the Commission within the judicial branch did not violate the separation of
powers principle because the Commission’s placement could not "possibly be construed as
preventing the Judicial Branch ‘from accomplishing its constitutionally assigned functions.’"
Id. at 395–96 (quoting Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977)).
77. See FISHER, supra note 1, at 12–13 ("Between 1983 and 1986, the Court flirted
with a [formalist] notion of separation of powers . . . . Although not directly overruling
those decisions, the Court in 1988 and again in 1989 issued rulings more favorable toward
the overlapping of powers, emphasizing checks and balances over a pure separation of
powers." (footnote omitted)).
78. See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 736 (1986) (concluding that the assignment
by Congress to the Comptroller General of certain functions violated the separation of
powers because Congress’s reservation of the removal power over the Comptroller General
was tantamount to congressional supervision of the execution of its laws). In Bowsher, the
Court considered the constitutionality of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit
Control Act of 1985, popularly known as the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act (Act), Pub. L.
No. 99-177, 99 Stat. 1038 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 31 U.S.C.). Id. at
717. The purpose of the Act was to "eliminate the federal budget deficit" by imposing a
"maximum deficit amount." Id. If this maximum deficit amount was exceeded, the Act
required the Comptroller General (CG) to prepare a report detailing "across-the-board cuts in
federal spending." Id. at 717–18. Once the CG forwarded the report to the President, the
Act required the President to implement the spending reductions. Id. at 718, 733. The Court
in Bowsher found that the CG, removable only by Congress, exercised executive power
under the Act’s provisions requiring the CG to prepare the spending reduction report. Id. at
732–33. The Court concluded that this arrangement violated the separation of powers by
reserving to Congress control over an official charged with execution of the laws. Id. at 734.
"By placing the responsibility for execution of the [Act] in the hands of an officer who is
subject to removal only by itself, Congress in effect has retained control over the execution
of the Act and has intruded into the executive function." Id.
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these older formalist79 decisions, the Court concluded that, once Congress
enacts a piece of legislation, it may not supervise or control the execution of
that statute.80
These three decisions yield a consolidated rule with respect to
separation of powers clashes between Congress and the President:
Congress (1) may not impermissibly interfere with the President’s ability to
fulfill his constitutional role, and (2) may not itself supervise or control the
execution of its laws.
B. Application of Supreme Court Precedent to SIGTARP’s Separation of
Powers Issue
1. Why the SIGTARP Dynamic Violates the Separation of Powers
Anterior to an application of this Supreme Court precedent to the
SIGTARP issue is an understanding of why SIGTARP poses a separation
of powers question. What follows is a synopsis of the argument for why
the SIGTARP dynamic violates the separation of powers pursuant to the
Supreme Court’s precedent.
EESA’s amendment mandates that the Treasury Secretary must either
(1) act to address the deficiencies identified by SIGTARP with respect to
TARP, or (2) certify to Congress that no action is necessary or
appropriate.81
This certification requirement could impermissibly
interfere82 with the President’s ability to fulfill his constitutional function
by compelling executive accountability to Congress with respect to how
Treasury utilizes its discretion in executing EESA.83 This accountability
79. See id. at 759 (White, J., dissenting) (lamenting the majority’s "willingness to
interpose its distressingly formalistic view of separation of powers as a bar to the attainment
of governmental objectives through the means chosen by the Congress and the President in
the legislative process established by the Constitution").
80. See id. at 726, 734 (majority opinion) ("The structure of the Constitution does not
permit Congress to execute the laws . . . . [or to] retain[] control over the execution of [its
laws] and [thereby] intrude[] into the executive function."). "[O]nce Congress makes its
choice in enacting legislation, its participation ends. Congress can thereafter control the
execution of its enactment only indirectly—by passing new legislation." Id. at 733–34
(citing Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 958 (1983)).
81. SIGTARP Act, Pub. L. No. 111-15, sec. 4(2)(f), § 121.
82. See supra notes 73–74 and accompanying text (discussing Supreme Court
precedent that finds that Congress may not, consistent with the separation of powers, act visà-vis the President in a manner that impermissibly interferes with the President’s ability to
fulfill his role as delineated by the Constitution).
83. See SIGTARP Act, sec. 4(2)(f)(2), § 121 (providing that, if the Treasury Secretary
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dynamic might impose upon the Treasury Secretary a mild congressional
threat in the form of an "either/or" demand—either the Secretary must
comply with SIGTARP’s recommendations or the Secretary must justify to
Congress his refusal to comply with those recommendations.84 By forcing
this choice on the Secretary, EESA arguably imposes a severe constraint on
the executive’s discretion in administering TARP, especially
considering the political arena in which the President operates.85 The
President will likely bear in mind that the Secretary’s refusal to comply
with SIGTARP will not sit well with the voting public, who will likely
perceive SIGTARP as a civil servant operating in the public interest to
monitor Treasury’s dispersal of the $700 billion of TARP taxpayer
money.86
However, EESA’s certification provision would tend to coerce
presidential action even without the aid of the political machine.87 By
elects not to follow SIGTARP’s recommendations, the Secretary must "certify" to the
appropriate congressional committees that no action is necessary or appropriate).
84. Id. , sec. 4(2)(f), § 121.
85. Cf. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 702, 713–14 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(discussing the negative political effects on the President should he choose not to appoint an
independent counsel in response to a congressional request for such an appointment for the
purpose of investigating alleged criminal violations of lower executive officials).
86. See 155 CONG. REC. H3,849 (daily ed. Mar. 25, 2009) (statement of Rep. Erik
Paulsen) ("[T]he American people deserve to know when Washington is spending taxpayer
dollars, and we are making every effort [through creating SIGTARP] to ensure that those
taxpayer dollars are being spent wisely . . . . American taxpayers deserve no less.").
Congressman Paulsen stated:
When the Federal Government is literally spending hundreds of billions of
dollars, it is critical that we have the most stringent oversight of that spending.
That is our obligation to the taxpayer . . . . They have the absolute right to know
that their money—it is their money—is being spent properly and wisely.
Id. at H3,851; see also Morrison, 487 U.S. at 702, 713–14 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting the
political consequences of a presidential refusal to comply with an ostensibly just demand by
Congress to appoint an independent counsel). "As a practical matter," Scalia observed, "it
would be surprising if the Attorney General had any choice . . . but to seek appointment of
an independent counsel to pursue the charges against the principal object of the
congressional request . . . ." Id. at 701–02. "Merely the political consequences (to . . . the
President) of seeming to break the law by refusing to do so would have been substantial."
Id. at 702. "How could it be, the public would ask, that a 3,000-page indictment drawn by
our representatives over [two-and-a-half] years does not establish ‘reasonable grounds to
believe’ that further investigation or prosecution is warranted with respect to at least the
principal alleged culprit?" Id.
87. Cf. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 702 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (discussing the negative
political consequences of a presidential refusal to acquiesce to a congressional request to
appoint an independent counsel and then observing that "the [independent counsel statute]
establishes more than just practical compulsion"). Justice Scalia then analyzed his
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requiring the Secretary to report to Congress, EESA implicitly obliges
the executive to determine whether the action recommended by
SIGTARP is necessary or appropriate.88 If the Secretary determines that
the recommended action is necessary or appropriate, EESA could be
interpreted to mandate the executive’s compliance with SIGTARP’s
recommendation. In other words, EESA’s certification requirement,
apart from levying upon the executive branch a constitutionally
questionable duty of explanation, might impermissibly interfere with the
President’s ability to execute the laws according to his own judgment by
imposing upon the President an obligation to comply with SIGTARP’s
recommendations unless the responses recommended by SIGTARP are
both unnecessary and inappropriate.89
If SIGTARP were an official subject to full executive supervision
and control, perhaps this statutory construction might not arouse serious
separation of powers concerns. However, although SIGTARP is
removable by the President,90 SIGTARP appears to be completely
immune to Treasury supervision and might not even be part of the
Treasury Department.91 Conversely, because SIGTARP reports only to
Congress,92 and because SIGTARP’s duty as an IG requires him to
maintain an evaluative detachment from the executive branch,93
SIGTARP’s loyalties are more likely directed toward Congress94 and,
interpretation of the statute, which he construed to mandate presidential compliance unless
there were no reasonable grounds to believe that further investigation was warranted into
supposed criminal violations by lower executive officials. Id.
88. SIGTARP Act, Pub. L. No. 111-15, sec. 4(2)(f)(2), § 121.
89. Cf. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 701–03 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (making a parallel
argument with respect to the effect of another congressional statute, namely, that the statute
"requires the Attorney General to apply for the appointment of an independent counsel . . .
unless he determines . . . that ‘there are no reasonable grounds to believe that further
investigation or prosecution is warranted.’" (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 592(b)(1))).
90. See supra note 60 (observing that the power to remove is tantamount to the power
to control).
91. See supra notes 57–60 and accompanying text (noting EESA’s vague language
with respect to SIGTARP’s independence from Treasury).
92. See supra notes 57–58 and accompanying text (observing that EESA explicitly
requires SIGTARP to report only to Congress).
93. See MILLER CTR. OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, supra note 3, at 4 (explaining that Congress
passed the IG Act to "check abuse in the executive branch").
94. See Christopher S. Yoo, Steven G. Calabresi & Anthony J. Colangelo, The Unitary
Executive in the Modern Era, 1945–2004, 90 IOWA L. REV. 601, 680 (2005) (stating that the
Department of Justice initially denounced the IG Act as making "the [IGs] subject to divided
and possibly inconsistent obligations to the executive and legislative branches, in violation
of the doctrine of separation of powers" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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furthermore, SIGTARP is likely subject to congressional influence.95
Hence, the recommendations that SIGTARP conveys to Treasury could
be intermingled with congressional instructions to Treasury with respect
to administering TARP. This likelihood directly affects the equilibrium
of power between the executive and legislative branches if, as discussed
above, EESA is interpreted to require both executive accountability to
Congress and executive compliance with SIGTARP recommendations
that are either necessary or appropriate.96 In essence, Congress could
have strategically inserted SIGTARP into the TARP program in a subtle
effort to supervise the execution of its monumental97 $700 billion
governmental bailout program in violation of the Supreme Court’s
separation of powers precedent.98
2. Supreme Court Precedent Applied to the SIGTARP Separation of
Powers Issue
a. Compelling Executive Accountability to Congress Through the
Certification Requirement
Congress, through EESA, presents to the Treasury Secretary two
options: (1) act to address TARP-related deficiencies identified by
SIGTARP, or (2) certify to Congress that "no action is necessary or
appropriate."99 By obliging the Secretary to "certify" to Congress when
he elects not to take action, Congress essentially has compelled
executive accountability with respect to how the Secretary responds to
SIGTARP’s recommendations.
This congressionally imposed
"either/or" ultimatum raises both Morrison and Bowsher issues, as
95. See FISHER, supra note 1, at 83 ("[Congress] can apply irresistible pressure both
for and against [executive] agency employees through its investigative power." (citing Louis
Fisher, Congress and the Removal Power, in DIVIDED DEMOCRACY 255–74 (James A.
Thurber ed., 1991))); see also id. at 80 ("One scholar estimated that congressional pressure is
responsible for more firings and reassignments of executive branch personnel than is
presidential action.").
96. See SIGTARP Act, Pub. L. No. 111-15, sec. 4(2)(f), § 121 (requiring the Treasury
Secretary to certify to Congress that no action with respect to a SIGTARP recommendation
is necessary or appropriate).
97. See supra notes 6, 8 and accompanying text (observing that Congress’s TARP
program qualifies as the largest governmental economic intervention program in history).
98. See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 734 (1986) (finding that Congress may not,
consistent with the Constitution, supervise or control the execution of its laws).
99. SIGTARP Act, sec. 4(2)(f), § 121.
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constraining the executive to choose between these two alternatives
could impermissibly interfere with the President’s ability to execute
EESA according to his own constitutional prerogative,100 and could
likewise constitute a congressional attempt to supervise the execution of
EESA.101
(1) Ascertaining the Meaning of "Certify"
Before this constitutional analysis may proceed, however, the precise
import of the term "certify" must be considered.102 "Certify" could signify
simply that the Secretary must notify Congress of his decision not to heed a
SIGTARP recommendation. In essence, a stoic communication, indicating
that the Secretary will not address a TARP-related deficiency identified by
SIGTARP because no action is necessary or appropriate (merely parroting
the statutory language), might satisfy the certification requirement.103
However, this benign construal of the statute likely contradicts
congressional intent.104 EESA’s legislative history reveals that Congress
contemplated extracting from the Secretary a statement explaining and
justifying his belief that no action is necessary or appropriate with respect
to a recommendation from SIGTARP.105 Furthermore, this latter
100. See supra notes 73–74 and accompanying text (discussing the rule set forth by the
Court in Morrison, namely, that Congress violates the separation of powers when it
impermissibly interferes with the executive’s ability to accomplish its constitutional
function).
101. See supra notes 78, 80 and accompanying text (discussing the Court’s precedent in
Bowsher, which stands for the proposition that Congress may not, consistent with the
Constitution, supervise or control the execution of its laws).
102. SIGTARP Act, Pub. L. No. 111-15, sec. 4(2)(f)(2), § 121.
103. See MILLER CTR. OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, supra note 3, at 4 (noting that "perfunctory"
responses have satisfied similar executive reporting requirements in the past). "A President
may remove an IG, but only after reporting his reasons to Congress [pursuant to the IG Act],
which raises separation of powers concerns." Id. "We note, however, that in practice the
reasons can be perfunctory, as when President Reagan told Congress that he was removing
all the IGs because he needed to have the ‘fullest confidence in the ability, integrity and
commitment’ of each." Id. ; see also FISHER, supra note 1, at 73 ("In 1981 Reagan removed
a dozen [IGs] governed by the [IG Act] but did not submit reasons to Congress other than a
general desire to have nominees of his own choosing.").
104. See Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 425 (1944) ("[T]he only concern of
courts is to ascertain whether the will of Congress has been obeyed.").
105. See 155 CONG. REC. H3,848 (daily ed. Mar. 25, 2009) (statement of Rep. Dennis
Moore) (noting that EESA "requir[es] the Treasury Secretary to explain why any SIGTARP
recommendation is not implemented"); see also H.R. REP. NO. 111-41(I), at 8–9 (2009)
(noting that EESA’s certification provision "[r]equires Treasury to notify Congress of the
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interpretation harmonizes more closely with the broader thrust of EESA,
which contains other provisions evidencing Congress’s desire to receive
continuing details on the executive’s management of TARP.106 The
important point is that, whichever interpretation prevails, the certification
requirement effectively compels executive accountability,107 provoking
separation of powers questions.
(2) The Certification Provision as a Mechanism for
Congressional Oversight
As discussed above, the Court in Bowsher concluded that, once
Congress enacts legislation, it may not supervise the execution of those
reason for failing to follow any written recommendations made by SIGTARP"). The House
Report’s use of the word "notify" could suggest Congress’s intent to require only a stoic
communication, void of any explanation, in the event that Treasury opts not to comply with
a SIGTARP recommendation. Supra note 103 and accompanying text. However, the House
Report also manifests Congress’s intent to oblige Treasury to proffer a "reason" for the
executive’s failure to take action on a recommendation from SIGTARP. H.R. REP. NO. 11141(I), at 8–9. This suggests that, by imposing the certification requirement upon Treasury,
Congress sought to elicit from the executive more than a mere bare-bones notification.
106. See, e.g., EESA, 12 U.S.C. § 121(c)(1) (listing a host of factors involving the
executive’s administration of TARP upon which Congress desires to remain informed).
EESA commissions SIGTARP to
conduct, supervise, and coordinate audits and investigations of the purchase,
management, and sale of assets by the Secretary of the Treasury under
[TARP] . . . , including by collecting and summarizing the following
information:
(A) A description of the categories of troubled assets purchased or otherwise
procured by the Secretary.
(B) A listing of the troubled assets purchased in each such category described
under subparagraph (A).
(C) An explanation of the reasons the Secretary deemed it necessary to purchase
each such troubled asset.
(D) A listing of each financial institution that such troubled assets were
purchased from.
(E) A listing of and detailed biographical information on each person or entity
hired to manage such troubled assets.
(F) A current estimate of the total amount of troubled assets purchased pursuant
to [TARP], the amount of troubled assets on the books of the Treasury, the
amount of troubled assets sold, and the profit and loss incurred on each sale or
disposition of each such troubled asset.
Id. § 121(c)(1)(A)–(F).
107. It is acknowledged, however, that the substance of the executive’s certification
will vary depending upon which interpretation is embraced.
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laws except through adopting new legislation.108 Despite the Court’s
straightforward ruling, congressional supervision of executive
implementation of the laws nonetheless persists.109 In fact, one of the
recognized ways in which Congress controls the execution of its laws is
through executive reporting requirements.110 The IG Act itself imposes
108. See supra notes 78–80 and accompanying text (discussing the separation of
powers rule in Bowsher).
109. See FISHER, supra note 1, at 289 (spurning the Bowsher rule as an "unrealistic
opinion" and one that has been rendered moot by practical considerations); Fisher, supra
note 28, at 143 (finding that "congressional oversight of executive activities is a legitimate
constitutional responsibility"). "[T]he Court claims in Bowsher that ‘once Congress makes
its choice in enacting legislation, its participation ends. Congress can thereafter control the
execution of its enactment only indirectly—by passing new legislation.’" Id. at 143 (quoting
Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 733–34 (1986)). "That, of course, is nonsense. Congress
controls the execution of its laws through hearings, committee investigations, studies by the
General Accounting Office, informal contacts between members of Congress and agency
officials, and nonstatutory controls." Id.; see also FISHER, supra note 1, at 289 (reviewing
the Bowsher rule and then observing that "[n]o one who reads the newspapers can believe
that"); Frederick M. Kaiser, Congressional Action to Overturn Agency Rules: Alternatives
to the "Legislative Veto", 32 ADMIN. L. REV. 667, 668 (1980) ("[S]ome observers have
attributed substantial influence to nonstatutory controls in regulatory as well as other
matters."). "Congress controls the execution of laws when each house invokes its contempt
power and when committees issue subpoenas." Fisher, supra note 28, at 143. In reality,
"[c]ontinued participation by Congress does not require the passage of public laws." FISHER,
supra note 1, at 289.
This continued participation by Congress is referred to as congressional oversight.
Some argue that, "without some means of overseeing the postenactment activities of the
executive branch, Congress would be unable to determine whether its policies have been
implemented in accordance with legislative intent and thus whether legislative intervention
is appropriate." Jacob K. Javits & Gary J. Klein, Congressional Oversight and the
Legislative Veto: A Constitutional Analysis, 52 N.Y.U. L. REV. 455, 460 (1977); see 1
BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF LAWS 169 (J.V. Pritchard ed., Thomas Nugent
trans., Fred. B. Rothman & Co. rev. ed. 1991) ("[T]he legislative power in a free state . . .
has a right and ought to have the means of examining in what manner its laws have been
executed . . . ."); Javits & Klein, supra, at 472–73 ("The purpose of congressional oversight
is to ensure that the Executive is administering the law in accordance with a dynamic
political intent based on Congress’s current interpretation of the public interest."); but see
Gates & Knowles, supra note 53, at 501 ("The DOJ emphasized that it ‘ha[d] repeatedly
taken the position that continuous oversight of the functioning of Executive agencies . . . is
not a proper legislative function.’" (footnote omitted)). "As an instrument of political
accountability then, congressional or legislative oversight is implicit in the constitutional
system of checks and balances." Javits & Klein, supra, at 460 (footnote omitted).
110. See Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 955 n.19
(1983) ("The Constitution provides Congress with abundant means to oversee and control its
administrative creatures. Beyond the obvious fact that Congress ultimately controls
administrative agencies in the legislation that creates them, other means of control, such
as . . . formal reporting requirements, lie well within Congress’ [sic] constitutional power.");
see also Javits & Klein, supra note 109, at 460–61 (finding that legislative oversight
includes "formal reporting requirements").
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upon the President a reporting requirement, enjoining the President, in the
event that he removes an IG from office, to explain to Congress the reasons
for that removal.111
Two executive reporting requirements survived the Court’s review in
Morrison. By upholding the independent counsel statute, the Court in
Morrison implicitly ratified two component reporting provisions
compelling the executive to convey information to Congress. One of the
provisions required the President to file an explanatory report with
Congress in response to a congressional request for the appointment of an
independent counsel,112 and the other provision required the President to
submit an explanatory report to Congress in the event that the President
removed the independent counsel from office.113
Despite the Court’s favorable treatment of this congressional control
mechanism, the Constitution explicitly recognizes only one instance in
111. See IG Act, 5 U.S.C. App. § 3(b) ("An [IG] may be removed from office by the
President. The President shall communicate the reasons for any such removal to both
Houses of Congress."). This provision is applicable to SIGTARP through EESA. EESA
§ 121(b)(4). The Department of Justice’s OLC initially opposed this reporting provision.
See 1 U.S. Op. Off. Legal Counsel 16, 18 (1977) ("[T]he requirement that the President
notify both Houses of Congress of the reasons for his removal of an [IG] constitutes an
improper restriction on the President’s exclusive power to remove Presidentially appointed
executive officers." (citing Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926))). Although OLC
conceded that Congress wields the power to restrict the President’s removal power over
quasi-judicial and quasi-legislative officers, id. (citing Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349
(1958), and Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935)), OLC asserted that "the
power to remove a subordinate appointed officer within one of the executive departments is
a power reserved to the President acting in his discretion." Id. However, OLC eventually
capitulated to the passage of the IG Act in a legislative-executive compromise. See Gates &
Knowles, supra note 53, at 502 ("The most important provisions of the compromise were to
require that [IGs] report to Congress through the Secretary, who could not change the
content of the report but who could respond to it, and to eliminate the limits on the
President’s authority to remove an IG." (footnote omitted)). However, the Supreme Court
has never considered the constitutionality of the IG Act. See supra note 72 and
accompanying text (observing that the constitutionality of IGs has never been entertained by
the Court).
112. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 694 (1988) ("The Act does empower certain
Members of Congress to request the Attorney General to apply for the appointment of an
independent counsel, but the Attorney General has no duty to comply with the request,
although he must respond within a certain time limit." (citations omitted)); id. at 702–03
(Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Where, as here, a request for appointment of an independent counsel
has come from [Congress], the Attorney General must, if he decides not to seek
appointment, explain to that [congressional] Committee why." (citations omitted)).
113. See id. at 663 (majority opinion) ("If an independent counsel is removed pursuant
to this section, the Attorney General is required to submit a report to [appropriate
congressional committees] specifying the facts found and the ultimate grounds for such
removal." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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which the President is required to report to Congress.114 Apart from this
patent constitutional concern with respect to the executive reporting
requirement involving SIGTARP, this reporting provision could also
transgress Morrison. Because TARP is such a politically charged program,
the executive accountability dynamic created by EESA automatically
bootstraps into the equation the political implications surrounding TARP.115
The glare of the public eye upon the executive’s administration of billions
of dollars of TARP taxpayer money, coupled with the duty to answer to
Congress if the Secretary spurns one of SIGTARP’s recommendations,
combines to produce a potent weapon for executive coercion.116 The
Secretary might feel pressured into complying with SIGTARP just so that
he does not have to account to Congress and so that he does not appear to
the watchful public to be disregarding the recommendations of an
independent auditor commissioned to safeguard TARP’s massive public
fund.117 Therefore, this dual-accountability dynamic created by EESA’s
"either/or" ultimatum might contravene Morrison by impermissibly
restricting the executive’s discretion in administering TARP.

114. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 ("[The President] shall from time to time give to the
Congress Information of the State of the Union . . . ."). Furthermore, it was the view of at
least some of the Founders that "[t]he principle of the Constitution is that of a separation of
legislative, executive, and judiciary functions, except in cases specified." ALLISON ET AL.,
supra note 27, at 623 (quoting 7 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 27, at 108
(emphasis added)).
115. See supra notes 6, 8 and accompanying text (observing that Congress’s TARP
program qualifies as the largest governmental economic intervention program in history).
The fact that Congress has committed at least $700 billion of taxpayer money to TARP will
simply increase the political attention surrounding the administration of TARP. See supra
notes 38–39 and accompanying text (observing that, although Congress has expressly
allocated only $700 billion to TARP, the total expenditures with respect to TARP could
exceed $23 trillion).
116. Cf. Morrison, 478 U.S. at 701–02 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (recognizing that the
executive accountability contemplated by the independent counsel statute gave rise to grave
political concerns). "As a practical matter, it would be surprising if the Attorney General
had any choice . . . but to seek appointment of an independent counsel to pursue the charges
against the principal object of the congressional request . . . ." Id.; see also supra notes 85–
86 and accompanying text (exploring further the political consequences implicated by the
potentially coercive provisions of both EESA and the independent counsel statute in
Morrison).
117. See Dugan & Rose, supra note 40 ("SIGTARP’s stated goal is to ensure that
taxpayers are aware of who is receiving TARP funds and how those funds are being used.").
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(3) The Court’s Record of Upholding Executive Reporting Requirements
Justice Scalia advanced a similar argument in Morrison, expressing
disquietude concerning the potential for politically generated coercion in
the event that the executive declined to respond affirmatively to a
congressional request for the appointment of an independent counsel.118
However, notwithstanding Justice Scalia’s concerns, the majority in
Morrison acknowledged no such possibility. Likewise, in the event a
question of SIGTARP’s constitutionality reaches the Supreme Court, the
Court is unlikely to acknowledge such a possibility with respect to
SIGTARP.
Hence, even though EESA’s executive certification requirement
operates as a tool for congressional supervision over the execution of
EESA119 (in direct contravention of Bowsher), similar reporting
requirements have been upheld by the Court. In fact, a reporting
requirement examined by the Court in Morrison mirrors the certification
requirement at issue in this Note.120 Based on the Court’s lack of anxiety
with respect to upholding the reporting requirement in Morrison, this same
attitude will likely prevail with respect to the certification requirement in
EESA.

118. See supra notes 85–86 (discussing the political consequences involved with the
independent counsel statute in Morrison).
119. See supra note 110 and accompanying text (observing that one of the recognized
ways in which Congress supervises the execution of its laws is through reporting
requirements).
120. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 592(b)–(c) (2006) (mandating that the Attorney General
must notify a special judicial body if he determines that "there are no reasonable grounds to
believe that further investigation is warranted" and, thus, that an independent counsel should
be appointed), with SIGTARP Act, Pub. L. No. 111-15, sec. 4(2)(f), § 121 (requiring the
Treasury Secretary to certify to Congress that no action with respect to a recommendation
from SIGTARP is necessary or appropriate). With respect to the statute at issue in
Morrison, when Congress itself (as opposed to the special judicial body) requested the
Attorney General to investigate possible criminal activity within the executive branch, the
Attorney General was required to respond to Congress regardless of whether the Attorney
General decided to apply for the appointment of an independent counsel. 28 U.S.C.
§ 592(g)(2). This unconditional reporting requirement could be considered more exacting
than EESA’s conditional reporting requirement, obliging the Secretary to report to Congress
only in the event that the Secretary elects not to address a TARP-related deficiency
identified by SIGTARP. SIGTARP Act, sec. 4(2)(f), § 121.
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b. Mandating the Treasury Secretary’s Compliance with SIGTARP
Recommendations that Are Either Necessary or Appropriate
Although the certification requirement functions as a mechanism for
congressional supervision over the execution of EESA, this constitutional
issue is dwarfed by the loss of executive discretion that is contemplated by
the language of this provision. EESA’s plain language requires the Secretary
either (1) to take action to address TARP-related deficiencies identified by
SIGTARP or (2) to certify to Congress that "no action is necessary or
appropriate."121 As noted above, one plausible interpretation of this provision
requires the executive to take action with respect to a TARP-related
deficiency identified by SIGTARP unless "no action is necessary or
appropriate."122 Pursuant to this statutory construction, one interpretation of
the Secretary’s protocol as mandated by the provision would be as follows.
(1) Determining Whether SIGTARP’s Recommended Action Is Necessary or
Appropriate
First, the provision is framed in a manner that creates a presumption of
action, as the first option presented to the executive requires the Secretary to
take action to address a deficiency identified by SIGTARP.123 If the
executive desires to avoid addressing a deficiency identified by SIGTARP or,
in other words, if the executive desires to rebut this presumption of action, the
Secretary must make a precedent determination that no action is necessary or
appropriate.124 Hence, the Secretary first must consider whether taking action
to address a TARP-related deficiency identified by SIGTARP is
"necessary."125 Before arriving at the determination of whether action is
necessary, the Secretary must delineate the precise meaning of the word
"necessary." In M’Culloch v. Maryland,126 Chief Justice Marshall rejected a
121. SIGTARP Act, sec. 4(2)(f), § 121.
122. See CONG. REC. H3,849 (daily ed. Mar. 25, 2009) (statement of Rep. Erik Paulsen)
(noting that EESA is intended to "requir[e] the Secretary of the Treasury to take action, or
certify that no action is necessary, when any problems or deficiencies are identified by
[SIGTARP]").
123. SIGTARP Act, sec 4(2)(f)(1), § 121.
124. See id., sec 4(2)(f)(2), § 121 (stating that the Secretary must certify to Congress
that no action is necessary or appropriate).

125. Id.
126. See M’Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 425, 436 (1819) (concluding that a
federal statute incorporating a bank was constitutional pursuant to Congress’s power under
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rigid, "indispensable necessity" construction of the term "necessary"127 and,
instead, adopted a permissive128 interpretation that now serves as the bedrock
for the meaning of the Necessary and Proper Clause.129
the Necessary and Proper Clause and, thus, that a state statute purporting to levy a tax upon
that federal bank was "unconstitutional and void"). In M’Culloch, the Court considered the
constitutionality of a Maryland statute that imposed a tax upon a federally chartered bank
that lay within the borders of the state. Id. at 319. After the federal bank refused to pay the
tax, the state of Maryland contended that, because the Constitution does not expressly
allocate to Congress the power to charter a bank, the federal law establishing the bank was
therefore repugnant to the Constitution. Id. at 406–07. However, the Court, in an opinion
authored by Chief Justice Marshall, concluded that Congress, pursuant to the Necessary and
Proper Clause, received the power to charter the bank as an implied power flowing from
Congress’s enumerated taxing power. Id. at 400–25. In the seminal excerpt from the
opinion, interpreting the Necessary and Proper Clause, Chief Justice Marshall penned, "Let
the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all means which are
appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with
the letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional." Id. at 421. Hence, because the
bank was chartered by Congress pursuant to the supreme law of the land, Maryland, as a
state, lacked the power to levy a tax upon that bank. Id. at 425–37.
127. See id. at 413 (rejecting the argument that "the ‘word’ necessary [means] limiting
the right to pass laws for the execution of granted powers[] to such as are indispensable");
see also U.S. v. Fisher, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 358, 396 (1805) ("In construing [the Necessary
and Proper Clause] it would be incorrect and would produce endless difficulties, if the
opinion should be maintained that no law was authorised [sic] which was not indispensably
necessary to give effect to a specified power."); David P. Currie, The Constitution in the
Supreme Court: State and Congressional Powers, 1801–1805, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 887, 930
(1982) (noting that Chief Justice Marshall rejected a construction of the Necessary and
Proper Clause contemplating "a requirement of indispensable necessity [that] would have
been so confining that it could hardly have been intended"). The Court in M’Culloch
observed that "[i]t must have been the intention of those who gave these powers, to insure,
so far as human prudence could insure, their beneficial execution." M’Culloch, 17 U.S. at
415. "This could not be done, by confining the choice of means to such narrow limits as not
to leave it in the power of congress to adopt any which might be appropriate, and which
were conducive to the end." Id.
128. See M’Culloch, 17 U.S. at 413–14 ("To employ the means necessary to an end, is
generally understood as employing any means calculated to produce the end, and not as
being confined to those single means, without which the end would be entirely
unattainable."); see also Fisher, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) at 396 ("Where various systems might be
adopted for that purpose, it might be said . . . that it was not necessary because the end might
be obtained by other means, [but] Congress . . . must be empowered to use any means which
are . . . conducive to the exercise of a power granted by the constitution."). Marshall
observed that "[a] thing may be necessary, very necessary, absolutely or indispensably
necessary." M’Culloch, 17 U.S. at 414. In the passage for which M’Culloch has come to be
known, the Court concluded, "Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the
constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end,
which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are
constitutional." Id. at 421.
129. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 (stating that Congress shall have power "[t]o
make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing
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However, in defining the term "necessary" as it appears in EESA,
deference may be given to Chief Justice Marshall’s practice of also
considering the context in which the term is utilized.130 In M’Culloch,
"necessary and proper" comprised the context in which the word
"necessary" was employed by the drafters of the Constitution.131 Marshall
recognized a direct correlation between the two words, deducing that
"proper" relaxed the "strict and rigorous meaning" of the preceding term,
"necessary."132
However, employing Marshall’s modus operandi likely will result in a
different conclusion with respect to EESA’s certification provision. The
word "and," as utilized in the Necessary and Proper Clause, suggests a
connection between the contiguous words, implying that "necessary" and
"proper" should be considered jointly as part of a single, unified analysis.
Conversely, Congress inserted the word "or" between the terms "necessary"
and "appropriate" as they appear in EESA. In contrast to the word "and,"
the term "or" signifies not a mutual correlation, but instead, a distinct
detachment between the adjacent words.133 Hence, within the context of
EESA, the terms "necessary" and "appropriate" should be considered
separately and sequentially, and not as part of a single, unified analysis.
For this reason, when determining whether to take action to address a
TARP-related deficiency identified by SIGTARP, the Secretary initially
must make an isolated determination with respect to whether action is
necessary.134 If the Secretary concludes that action is necessary, EESA
Powers, and all other Powers vested by the Constitution in the Government of the United
States, or in any Department or Officer thereof").
130. See M’Culloch, 17 U.S. at 418 ("In ascertaining the sense in which the word
‘necessary’ is used in [the Necessary and Proper Clause], we may derive some aid from that
with which it is associated.").
131. Id. at 418–19.
132. See id. ("If the word ‘necessary’ was used in [a] strict and rigorous sense . . . , it
would be an extraordinary departure from the usual course of the human mind, as exhibited
in composition, to add a word, the only possible effect of which is, to qualify that strict and
rigorous meaning . . . .").
133. While the word "or" might also be employed to connote similarity between two
adjoining words (such as in the phrase "substance or meaning"), this construction likely does
not comport with the phrase "necessary or appropriate," in which the adjoining words do not
bear such similarity. SIGTARP Act, Pub. L. No. 111-15, sec. 4(2)(f)(2), § 121.
Furthermore, although Chief Justice Marshall found correspondence between two seemingly
incompatible words ("necessary and proper"), the connector "and," not "or," was utilized in
that phrase. Supra notes 130–33.
134. See supra notes 125–33 (endeavoring to ascertain the precise meaning of the term
"necessary" as used in EESA’s executive certification requirement). Although the precise
meaning of "necessary" is unclear, it is not the purpose of this Note to discern the specific
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could be construed to compel the Secretary to undertake that action.
According to the statutory language, if the Secretary elects not to take
action, he must certify to Congress that no action is necessary or
appropriate.135 Thus, if action is in fact necessary, then the Secretary
cannot, in accordance with the statute, proffer a contrary certification to
Congress.136
If the executive determines that no action is necessary, the inquiry
does not end there. Instead, the Secretary must proceed to the second,
distinct question of whether action is "appropriate."137 If the executive
determines that taking action on a TARP-related deficiency as identified by
SIGTARP is not appropriate, then the Secretary may elect not to take action
and may certify to Congress, in accordance with the statute, that no action
is necessary or appropriate.138 However, if the Secretary believes that
action is appropriate,139 the Secretary must initiate that action because the
Secretary in fact could not, in accordance with the statute, certify to
Congress that no action is necessary or appropriate.140 If the Secretary
determined that action was appropriate, yet nonetheless tendered to
Congress a contrary certification, this false certification in direct
contravention of the statute would comprise a blatant refusal to execute the
law according to statutory directives.141
congressional intent behind the word’s precise meaning.
135. SIGTARP Act, sec. 4(2)(f)(2), § 121.
136. See id. (mandating that the Secretary must certify to Congress that no action is
necessary or appropriate).

137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. It is not the purpose of this Note to pinpoint the precise import of the term
"appropriate." Suffice it to say, however, that the Secretary, according to the statute, must
determine whether action is appropriate.

140. Id.
141. In discussing the independent counsel statute at issue in Morrison, Justice Scalia
argued that the statute imposed upon the Attorney General a duty to comply with a
congressional request for the appointment of an independent counsel unless the Attorney
General could conclude that there were no reasonable grounds to believe that further
investigation was warranted. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 702 (1988) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting). Scalia then commented that the majority "makes much of the fact that the courts
are specifically prevented from reviewing the Attorney General’s decision not to seek
appointment." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Scalia countered by asserting, "Yes,
but Congress is not prevented from reviewing it. The context of this statute is acrid with the
smell of threatened impeachment." Id. (footnote omitted); see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cls. 4–
5 (conferring upon Congress the power of impeachment). For a more detailed discussion of
Morrison and the independent counsel statute, see supra notes 73–74 and accompanying
text, and infra notes 142–45 and accompanying text.
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However, this situation does not constitute the only discretionrestricting problem created by EESA’s certification provision. The
provision also produces a decision-making dynamic in which SIGTARP
creates a baseline consisting of problems that it has determined must be
addressed by Treasury. The Secretary is required to "take action" to
address these problems. The implication is that the Secretary is to take such
action without delay. The Secretary’s only other option is to certify that
immediate action is neither necessary nor appropriate. As such, Congress
has created a presumption of action that the Secretary may rebut—but only
within the parameters set by Congress. The Secretary is therefore
preempted from concluding that action is "necessary" but best pursued at a
later time or under different circumstances. Furthermore, if the Secretary
determines that immediate action on SIGTARP-identified deficiencies is
not necessary, he must proceed to determine whether such action is
nevertheless "appropriate." If he determines that action on SIGTARPidentified deficiencies is indeed "appropriate," but that action on other
deficiencies not identified by SIGTARP is more appropriate for immediate
action, EESA’s certification provision restricts his discretion to elect the
latter option.
(2) The Independent Counsel Statute in Morrison
Whether the previous analysis (concluding that the Secretary must take
immediate action to address TARP-related deficiencies identified by
SIGTARP that are either necessary or appropriate) accurately comports
with what the statute requires ultimately distills into a question of statutory
interpretation. A contrary construction of the statute is likewise plausible.
In Morrison, the Court entertained a statute that was susceptible to a
meaning similar to the one advocated by this Note with respect to EESA’s
certification provision.142 The problematic statute in Morrison provided, in
relevant part, that:
If the Attorney General, upon completion of a preliminary investigation
under this chapter, determines that there are no reasonable grounds to
believe that further investigation is warranted, the Attorney General
shall promptly so notify the division of the court, and the division of the
court shall have no power to appoint an independent counsel with
respect to the matters involved.
142. See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 659 (stating that the case presented the Court with a
constitutional challenge with respect to the Ethics in Government Act of 1978).
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The Attorney General shall apply to the division of the court for the
appointment of an independent counsel if . . . the Attorney General,
upon completion of a preliminary investigation under this chapter,
determines that there are reasonable grounds to believe that further
investigation is warranted; or . . . the 90-day period . . . and any
extension granted . . . have elapsed and the Attorney General has not
filed a notification with the division of the court . . . .143

In his dissent in Morrison, Justice Scalia urged the Court to adopt a
statutory construction that imposed upon the Attorney General "a duty to
comply [with a request for the appointment of an independent counsel]
unless he could conclude that there were ‘no reasonable grounds to
believe,’ . . . that ‘further investigation’ was warranted."144 However,
despite Scalia’s insistence to the contrary, the majority in Morrison adopted
an interpretation of the independent counsel statute that contemplated no
such executive duty of compliance.145 Unless EESA’s certification clause
is distinguishable from the independent counsel statute, the Court’s
reasoning in Morrison will likely control.

143. 28 U.S.C. § 592(b)–(c) (2006).
144. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 702 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted) (quoting 28
U.S.C. § 592(b)(1)). "Thus, by the application of this statute in the present case, Congress
has effectively compelled a criminal investigation of a high-level appointee of the
President . . . ." Id. at 703. Justice Scalia continued by asserting:
[W]e . . . know that the investigation of [this high-level presidential appointee]
has been commenced, not necessarily because the President or his authorized
subordinates believe it is in the interest of the United States, . . . and not even . . .
because the President or his authorized subordinates necessarily believe that an
investigation is likely to unearth a violation worth prosecuting; but only because
the Attorney General cannot affirm, as Congress demands, that there are no
reasonable grounds to believe that further investigation is warranted.
Id. Justice Scalia noted that the statute gave rise to a "condition that renders . . . a request
[for the appointment of an independent counsel] mandatory." Id. at 707. That condition,
according to Scalia, was the "inability to find ‘no reasonable grounds to believe’ that further
investigation is warranted." Id.
145. See id. at 694 (majority opinion) ("The Act does empower certain Members of
Congress to request the Attorney General to apply for the appointment of an independent
counsel, but the Attorney General has no duty to comply with the request, although he must
respond within a certain time limit." (citing 28 U.S.C. § 592(g))). The majority also noted
that, "[u]nlike previous cases, [like] Bowsher v. Synar, this case simply does not pose a
‘dange[r] of congressional usurpation of Executive Branch functions.’" Id. (quoting
Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 727 (1986)).
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(3) The Court’s Willingness to Tolerate Congressional Restriction of
Executive Discretion as long as the Stripped Discretion Is Not
Absorbed by Congress
Although the statutory language is different, the general meaning
behind both statutes is similar.146 Despite the Morrison majority’s
unwillingness to read into the statute an executive duty of compliance, the
statutory language clearly imposes upon the executive a duty to comply
with a request for the appointment of an independent counsel if the
executive "determines that there are reasonable grounds to believe that
further investigation is warranted."147 Furthermore, the Court in Morrison
never explicitly rejected the construction that the statute both effectuated a
degree of executive coercion and mandated compliance if reasonable
grounds exist.148 Instead, the Court hung its hat on the fact that Congress
did not "retain[] for itself . . . [the] power[] of control or supervision over an
independent counsel," and that Congress did not attempt "to increase its
own powers at the expense of the Executive Branch."149 Hence, it seems
that the Court will tolerate congressional restriction of executive discretion
as long as the stripped discretion is not subsumed by Congress.150
146. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 592(b)–(c) (hinging the Attorney General’s obligation to
apply for the appointment of an independent counsel upon a determination of whether there
exist "reasonable grounds to believe that further investigation is warranted"), with SIGTARP
Act, Pub. L. No. 111-15, sec. 4(2)(f), § 121 (predicating the Treasury Secretary’s obligation
to take action with respect to a TARP-related deficiency as identified by SIGTARP upon an
implicit determination of whether action is "necessary or appropriate").
147. 28 U.S.C. § 592(c)(1).
148. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 694 (1988). Rather, the Court concluded only
that the Attorney General "has no duty to comply with the request [for the appointment of an
independent counsel]." Id. The Court did not deny that the executive had a duty to comply
with a request if there existed reasonable grounds to believe that further investigation was
warranted. 28 U.S.C. § 592(c)(1).
149. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 694; see also Lee S. Liberman, Morrison v. Olson: A
Formalistic Perspective on Why the Court was Wrong, 38 AM. U. L. REV. 313, 351 (1989)
(observing that Morrison stands for the proposition that "separation of powers challenges
based on attempts by one branch to encroach on another’s functions should be reviewed
much more stringently than attempts by one branch to take away the power of one branch
but not draw it to itself").
150. Cf. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 694 ("We observe first that this case does not involve an
attempt by Congress to increase its own powers at the expense of the Executive Branch.").
The Court noted that the statute in Morrison did not pose the danger of "congressional
usurpation of Executive Branch functions" as did a statute in Bowsher. Id. (internal
quotation marks omitted); see also supra notes 78–80 and accompanying text (offering an
overview of the Court’s decision in Bowsher). In Bowsher, the statute at issue required the
President to implement budgetary cuts exactly in accordance with the report of an officer
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Therefore, although EESA’s certification provision appears to restrict
executive discretion by obliging the Secretary to take action with respect to
a SIGTARP recommendation when such action is either necessary or
appropriate, this congressional restriction on executive discretion will likely
pass constitutional muster, pursuant to Morrison, as long as the lost
discretion is not absorbed by Congress.151 The stripped executive discretion
at issue here is the discretion to execute EESA and to administer TARP
according to the President’s own judgment.152 The Treasury Secretary’s
ability to exercise his discretion in expending executive resources in
managing TARP is hampered by the statutory construction advocated
above.153 Hence, the issue now concerns the entity that has absorbed the
discretion removed from the executive by Congress. By decree of EESA,
SIGTARP has subsumed this executive discretion.154 Therefore, the inquiry
necessarily becomes whether Congress controls SIGTARP and, thus,
whether Congress, in violation of the separation of powers, is the entity that
has implicitly absorbed the executive discretion that has been stripped from
the executive by EESA.
over whom Congress had retained the power to remove. See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S.
714, 718, 733 (1986) ("The President . . . must issue a[n] . . . order mandating the spending
reductions specified by the Comptroller General . . . . Indeed, the Comptroller General
commands the President himself to carry out, without the slightest variation . . . , the
directive of the Comptroller General as to the budget reductions . . . ." (citing 2 U.S.C.
§ 252(a)(3))); HALSTEAD, supra note 69, at 16 (noting that the report "by the Comptroller
General would . . . be forwarded to the President who was required to issue an order
enforcing the spending reductions"). The Court’s decision in Bowsher seems to stand for the
proposition that, although Congress may restrict executive discretion, this stripped discretion
may not, in turn, be absorbed by Congress into its own vortex. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 48
(James Madison), supra note 27, at 343 (observing that the legislative branch has a tendency
to "extend[] the sphere of its activity, and draw[] all power into its impetuous vortex").
151. Supra note 150 and accompanying text.
152. See supra Part III.B.2.b (discussing how EESA could be construed to limit
executive discretion through mandating the Secretary’s compliance with SIGTARP
recommendations that are either necessary or appropriate).
153. Supra Part III.B.2.b.
154. See IG Act, 5 U.S.C. App. § 4(a)(2)–(3) (providing that an IG possesses the duty
to "review . . . legislation and regulations relating to . . . such establishment and to make
[related] recommendations . . . [and] to recommend policies for . . . [the] activities [of] such
establishment" in order to promote economy and efficiency and in order to prevent and to
detect fraud or abuse). In response to these deficiencies presented to the executive by
SIGTARP, the Secretary must either take action to address them or certify to Congress that
no action is necessary or appropriate. SIGTARP Act, Pub. L. No. 111-15, sec. 4(2)(f)(2),
§ 121. Hence, SIGTARP in essence possesses the discretion to direct execution of EESA
through recommending to the Secretary TARP-related action that is either necessary or
appropriate and, thus, action that the Secretary may not refuse to undertake pursuant to the
statute.
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c. SIGTARP’s Independence from the Executive Branch
The Supreme Court has ruled that the power to remove equates to the
power to control.155 Hence, because the executive branch retains removal
power over SIGTARP,156 cursory reflection suggests that Congress has not
absorbed the discretion that is stripped from the executive by means of
EESA’s certification provision.157 Pursuant to this perfunctory analysis, the
dynamic between SIGTARP and the executive branch (created by EESA’s
certification provision) does not transgress the separation of powers
principle.
However, the above analysis fails to appreciate the subtlety of the
issue with respect to which entity controls SIGTARP—in essence, this
issue comes "clad . . . in sheep’s clothing."158 The unusual independence
from executive supervision with which SIGTARP operates, coupled with
the loyalty to Congress that characterizes SIGTARP’s station, strongly
challenges the conclusion that Congress lacks control over SIGTARP.
Hence, this issue warrants a more comprehensive examination.

155. See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 720 (1986) ("Under the separation of powers
established by the Framers of the Constitution, . . . Congress may not retain the power of
removal over an officer performing executive functions. The congressional removal power
created a ‘here-and-now subservience’ of the Comptroller General to Congress." (citations
omitted)). The Court in Bowsher concluded that "Congress cannot reserve for itself the
power of removal of an officer charged with the execution of the laws except by
impeachment." Id. at 726. "To permit the execution of the laws to be vested in an officer
answerable only to Congress would, in practical terms, reserve in Congress control over the
execution of the laws." Id. "Once an officer is appointed, it is only the authority that can
remove him, and not the authority that appointed him, that he must fear and, in the
performance of his functions, obey." Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
156. EESA, 12 U.S.C. § 5231(b)(4); see also IG Act § 3(b) ("An Inspector General may
be removed from office by the President.").
157. See supra Part III.B.2.b.(3) (querying whether Congress, in violation of the
separation of powers, has retained control over SIGTARP and, thus, has subsumed the
discretion stripped from the executive through EESA’s certification provision).
158. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 699 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
("Frequently an issue of this sort will come before the Court clad, so to speak, in sheep’s
clothing: the potential of the asserted principle to effect important change in the equilibrium
of power is not immediately evident, and must be discerned by a careful and perceptive
analysis.").
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(1) SIGTARP’s Distinctive Independence from the Executive Branch
The degree of independence from executive supervision with which
SIGTARP functions distinguishes SIGTARP from all other IGs.159
SIGTARP’s unprecedented independence from the executive branch is a
significant factor, considering both that the executive exercises only
"nominal" supervisory authority over all other IGs in the first place160 and
that IGs are already supposed to operate with an "unusual" degree of
independence from the executive branch.161 All other IGs, pursuant to the
IG Act, must submit reports to their respective agency head, yield to the
general supervision of the agency head, and keep that agency head fully and
currently informed.162 Furthermore, although an agency head may not alter
159. See supra notes 57–59 and accompanying text (observing that the accountability
relationship between SIGTARP and the executive branch is unique among all other IGs).
160. See U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, Wash., D.C. v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth.,
25 F.3d 229, 235 (4th Cir. 1994) (referring to the supervisory authority exercised by agency
heads over IGs as "nominal"). In this case, the Fourth Circuit upheld the independence of
IGs from the executive branch by declining to interpret a statute in a manner that would have
"impinge[d] on the statutory independence of the [specific IG at issue in the case]." Id. at
234; see id. at 235 ("[W]e would indirectly be authorizing the parties to collective bargaining
to compromise, limit, and interfere with the independent status of the [IG] under the [IG
Act].").
161. See S. REP. NO. 95-1071, at 9 (1978), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2676,
2684 ("[Congress] wants [IGs] of high ability, stature and an unusual degree of
independence—outsiders, at least to the extent that they will have no vested interest in the
programs and policies whose economy, efficiency and effectiveness they are evaluating.").
In fact, Congress intended for IGs to function with such independence from the executive
branch that the IG Act originally was referred to the Senate as "the bill to reorganize the
executive branch of the Government." Id. at 1. During the time of the congressional debates
preceding passage of the IG Act, various governmental officials expressed concern that IGs
"would not be clearly accountable to anyone in the executive branch." Gates & Knowles,
supra note 53, at 485. Furthermore, since the passage of the IG Act, others have expressed
dismay with respect to IGs’ increasingly enhanced independence. See MILLER CTR. OF
PUBLIC AFFAIRS, supra note 3, at 5 ("The fundamental problem is that no one watches the
watchdogs. There is no central agency that collects information about what each [IG] is
doing . . . . The IGs, born independent by design, are now so independent that some have
begun to run amok. They constantly seek more authority . . . .").
162. Supra notes 55–56 and accompanying text. Although an agency head wields
"general" supervisory power over an IG, Congress intended that no other agency official
would exercise supervisory authority over an IG. See S. REP. NO. 95-1071, at 7 ("The [IG]
would be under the general supervision of the head of the agency or his deputy, but not
under the supervision of any other official in the agency."). However, as discussed above,
even the "general" supervisory authority possessed by the agency head amounts to only
"nominal" efficacy. Supra note 160 and accompanying text. Congress did not intend for the
agency head to be able to "prevent the [IG] from initiating and completing audits and
investigations he believes necessary." S. REP. NO. 95-1071, at 7; see also id. at 26 ("If the
head of an establishment asked the [IG] not to undertake a certain audit or investigation or to
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the periodical reports that IGs must submit to Congress, an agency head
may comment on those reports.163
Despite the "unique"164 independence that all other IGs already enjoy
within the executive branch, SIGTARP stretches this independence yet
further. While EESA explicitly requires that SIGTARP submit reports to
Congress, EESA does not explicitly require that SIGTARP report to or be
supervised by an agency head.165 Furthermore, EESA makes no explicit
allowance for the Treasury Secretary to comment on the reports that
SIGTARP prepares for Congress.166 EESA’s failure to provide explicitly
for these accountability arrangements stands in bold contrast to the
requirements imposed upon all other IGs by the IG Act.167 In fact,
subjecting SIGTARP to even the slightest degree of Treasury supervision
seems to cut against both the language of EESA and congressional intent.168

discontinue a certain audit or investigation, the [IG] would have the authority to refuse the
request and to carry out his work."). In fact, Congress subjected IGs to the general
supervision of agency heads only to foster a "smooth working relationship with the
department head." Id.
163. Supra note 57.
164. See S. REP. NO. 95-1071, at 31 ("[Congress] intends to confer upon the [IG] a
unique status within the executive branch.").
165. Supra notes 57–58 and accompanying text.
166. Supra note 57.
167. See supra note 57 (discussing the confusion spawned by the ambiguity between
EESA and the IG Act with respect to SIGTARP’s relationship with the executive branch).
168. See Letter from Neil M. Barofsky to Bernard Knight, Jr., supra note 62, at 1
("SIGTARP believes that [EESA] provides that SIGTARP is an independent entity within
Treasury[] [and] that SIGTARP is not subject to the Secretary’s supervision . . . ."). In his
letter, Barofsky noted that, by expressly depositing SIGIR and SIGAR under the supervision
of their respective agency heads, Congress "demonstrated its ability to assign supervisory
authority to [IGs], . . . when it intends to do so." Id. at 2–3. Barofsky continued by
asserting, "Given that Congress knows how to assign supervisory duties, the omission of this
language in EESA signifies its clear intention to preserve SIGTARP’s independence and not
subject us to the Secretary’s [supervision]." Id. at 3; see also Dugan & Rose, supra note 40
(observing that Treasury’s claim of supervisory authority over SIGTARP "seems contrary to
Congress’s intent to charge SIGTARP with responsibility for aggressively guarding the
TARP program from fraud and abuse . . . . [A] lack of independence from Treasury could
tarnish the perception that SIGTARP has the ability to do its job effectively"). Furthermore,
Barofksy stated, Congress incorporated into EESA only specific, enumerated provisions of
the IG Act and established SIGTARP not "within the IG Act[,] [but] placed us within
[another] chapter . . . of the United States Code." Letter from Neil M. Barofsky to Bernard
Knight, Jr., supra note 62, at 3. Barofsky then cited the statement of Senator Max Baucus,
the "legislative architect" of the EESA section that created SIGTARP: "I designed the office
of this [IG] to be truly Independent . . . ." Id. at 3 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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(2) The Tense Relationship Between SIGTARP and Treasury

SIGTARP’s unparalleled independence from the executive branch is
aggrandized by the tension that naturally characterizes the relationship
between an IG and its respective agency head.169 Congress inserts IGs into
executive agencies to operate as "[c]ongressional ferrets"170 whose prime
role is to expose corruption and abuse within the executive branch.171 In
performing this function, IGs exercise complete discretion in pursuing
audits and investigations,172 enjoy unrestricted access to executive
documents and materials,173 and wield the pungent subpoena power.174 A
169. See S. REP. NO. 95-1071, at 9 (1978), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2676,
2684 ("[Congress] does not doubt that some tension can result from th[e] relationship
[between an agency head and an IG] . . . ."). Congress noted "a natural tendency for an
agency administrator to be protective of the programs that he administers. In some cases,
frank recognition of waste, mismanagement or wrongdoing reflects on him personally." Id.
at 7. "Even if he is not personally implicated, revelations of wrongdoing or waste may
reflect adversely on his programs and undercut public and congressional support for them.
Under these circumstances, it is a fact that agency . . . supervisors in the executive branch do
not always identify or come forward with evidence of failings in the programs they
administer." Id. For this reason, Congress asserted, "the audit and investigative functions
should be assigned to an individual whose independence is clear." Id. However, Congress
acknowledged concerns "that the [IG] may become an adversary of the agency head and
undermine his ability to run the agency." Id. at 9.
170. See MILLER CTR. OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, supra note 3, at 4 ("IGs . . . serve as
members of the Executive Branch yet report to Congress about the internal workings of their
agencies. They serve, in other words, within executive agencies as Congressional ferrets of
dubious constitutionality . . . .").
171. See IG Act, 5 U.S.C. App. § 2(2)(B) (establishing IGs to "prevent and detect fraud
and abuse" in executive agencies).
172. See BURROWS, supra note 46, at 9 ("[M]ost IGs have virtually unfettered discretion
over initiating and conducting audits and investigations dealing with waste, fraud, and abuse
within their own agencies. As a corollary, they may accept, delay, modify, or reject a
request to conduct an audit or investigation from any party . . . ."); supra note 162 (observing
that an IG possesses the authority to rebuff a request from an agency head not to perform an
audit or an investigation).
173. See 1 U.S. Op. Off. Legal Counsel, supra note 111, at 17 (expressing concern with
respect to IGs’ "unrestricted access to executive branch materials and information"); see also
EESA, 12 U.S.C. § 121(e)(4)(A) ("Upon request of [SIGTARP] for information or
assistance from any department, agency, or other entity of the Federal Government, the head
of such entity shall, insofar as practicable and not in contravention of any existing law,
furnish such information or assistance to [SIGTARP] . . . ."); IG Act § 6(a)–(b) (establishing
IGs’ authority to "have access to all records, reports, audits, reviews, documents, papers,
recommendations, or other material available to the applicable establishment which relate to
programs and operations with respect to which that [IG] has responsibilities").
174. See EESA § 121(d)(1) (providing that SIGTARP "shall have the authorities
provided in Section 6 of the [IG Act]"); IG Act § 6(a)(4) (providing that each IG is
authorized "to require by subpena [sic] the production of all information, documents, reports,
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resourceful IG that burrows tenaciously through an executive agency in
search of evidence of fraud or abuse will likely aggravate an agency head,
sparking the internal tension of which Congress spoke.175 However, the
friction between SIGTARP and the Treasury Secretary appears to rival the
level of tension that customarily defines the relationship between an IG and
an agency head. Apart from the public showdown between SIGTARP and
the Secretary with respect to Treasury’s supervisory authority over
SIGTARP,176 Barofsky continues to assert his "aggressive posture" in
discharging his responsibilities.177 Barofsky’s unyielding fidelity in
tracking Treasury’s management of TARP’s mega-taxpayer fund surely
will kindle additional discomfort in the Treasury Secretary against
SIGTARP as the Secretary’s every move is thrust under the microscope of
public scrutiny.178
answers, records, accounts, papers, and other data and documentary evidence necessary in
the performance of the functions assigned [to each IG], which subpena [sic], . . . shall be
enforceable by . . . any . . . United States district court").
175. Supra note 169 and accompanying text.
176. See supra notes 61–65 and accompanying text (recounting the 2009 faceoff
between SIGTARP and the Secretary with respect to Treasury’s supervisory authority over
SIGTARP).
177. See Perez & Solomon, supra note 62 ("Barofsky has gained a reputation for his
aggressive posture and demands for information from government officials and Wall
Street."); see also AIG Investigator: Where the Billions Went, CNBC, Jan. 26, 2010,
http://m.cnbc.com/us_news/35076141 (last visited Feb. 16, 2011) ("Barofsky is setting off
fireworks on Capitol Hill as he quietly and methodically pieces together the most complete
historical record yet of the financial bailout. His reports are careful but not cautious,
showing a willingness to stand up to some of the most powerful people and institutions in
Washington . . . .") (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
"There are, in fact, several other panels charged with reviewing and monitoring the
bailout. But Mr. Barofsky is the only one backed by federal agents who carry guns and
badges and, if necessary, can break the locks off file cabinets." Id. "Those added powers,
and an attitude honed during . . . years of fighting white-collar criminals and Colombian
drug lords as [a federal prosecutor]—he still has the knife from a foiled attempt on his life in
a field outside Bogota—are propelling . . . Barofsky over barriers that have slowed the
others." Id.
In SIGTARP’s most current quarterly report, Barofsky boldly announces the
deficiencies with respect to Treasury’s recent management of TARP, declaring that, "even if
TARP saved our financial system from driving off a cliff back in 2008, absent meaningful
reform, we are still driving on the same winding mountain road, but this time in a faster car."
OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GEN. FOR THE TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF P ROGRAM,
QUARTERLY REPORT TO CONGRESS 6 (Jan. 30, 2010), available at http://www.
sigtarp.gov/reports/congress/2010/January2010_Quarterly_Report_to_Congress.pdf.
178. See 155 CONG. REC. H3,850 (daily ed. Mar. 25, 2009) (statement of Rep. Dennis
Moore) (referring to Congress’s creation of TARP and posing the question, "What did the
American people get or what can they expect to get from the $700 billion rescue plan?").
Legislative history indicates that Congress invented SIGTARP "to make sure that the
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(3) SIGTARP’s Loyalty to Congress

These twin issues—the extreme independence from the executive
branch and the elevated tension with the Treasury Secretary—that typify
SIGTARP’s relationship with the executive branch combine to produce the
appearance that SIGTARP is steadily pulling away from the executive
branch. In contrast to this uneasy association, EESA structures a
relationship between SIGTARP and Congress that is characterized by
mutual loyalty. The potential for congressional loyalty has sparked debate
with respect to the constitutionality of IGs since the inception of the IG
Act.179 An IG essentially serves as an extension of Congress’s oversight
arm within executive agencies,180 seeking to ascertain whether "funds are
being spent in accordance with the mandate and will of Congress."181 In
addition both to reporting directly to Congress and to keeping Congress
fully and currently informed, an IG is "the only executive branch
Presidential appointee who speaks directly to Congress without clearance
from the Office of Management and Budget."182 Furthermore, Congress

taxpayers receive meaningful answers to these questions [and] to make certain that the
money is spent wisely and to ensure that waste, fraud and mismanagement is avoided." Id.
179. See 1 U.S. Op. Off. Legal Counsel, supra note 111, at 17 ("An even more serious
problem is raised, in our opinion, by the provisions that make the [IGs] subject to divided
and possibly inconsistent obligations to the executive and legislative branches, in violation
of the doctrine of separation of powers."). Congress acknowledged that, "[f]ocusing on the
special responsibilities to report to Congress, some critics have argued that the [IG] will be
serving two masters, making the position untenable." S. REP. NO. 95-1071, at 9 (1978), as
reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2676, 2684. The Department of Justice underscored this
issue by asserting that
the [IG]’s obligation to keep Congress fully and currently informed, taken with
the mandatory requirement that he provide any additional information or
documents requested by Congress, and the condition that his reports be
transmitted to Congress without executive branch clearance or approval, is
inconsistent with his status as an officer in the executive branch, reporting to and
under the general supervision of the head of the agency.
1 U.S. Op. Off. Legal Counsel, supra note 111, at 17.
180. See BURROWS, supra note 46, at 9 ("IGs are intended to serve as an oversight arm
of Congress within agencies . . . .").
181. Gates & Knowles, supra note 53, at 484 (footnote and internal quotation marks
omitted).
182. Id. at 475. "This ability to speak directly to Congress provides a potential source
of substantial clout for an active inspector general." Id.; see also Hartmus, supra note 57, at
249 ("[T]his ability to speak directly to Congress protects the independence of the IG and is
a source of significant power.").
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possesses the power to request IGs to acquire specific executive
information.183
Perhaps Congress encapsulated the issue best when it stated that IGs
were fashioned by Congress in such a way that their "responsibility runs
directly to the agency head and ultimately to the Congress."184 SIGTARP
recently demonstrated this innate allegiance to Congress when, after
Treasury asserted supervisory authority over SIGTARP, SIGTARP
threatened to inform Congress if Treasury interfered with SIGTARP’s
independence.185
d. Whether the Combination of Executive Independence and Congressional
Control over SIGTARP Violates the Separation of Powers
This analysis with respect to SIGTARP’s independence from the
executive branch reveals that Congress wields a substantial measure of
control over SIGTARP. Ultimately, SIGTARP’s supposed "independence"
from the executive amounts, in reality, not to independence from the
executive, but to loyalty to Congress.186 More freedom from the executive
branch results merely in more control by Congress.187 Despite the fact that
183. See BURROWS, supra note 46, at 9 ("The legislative history of the IG Act supports
the understanding that Congress could ask IGs for information." (citing 124 CONG. REC.
32,032 (1978))). However, ambiguity pervades the congressional history with respect to this
point. Compare 124 CONG. REC. 32,032 (1978) ("[T]here is no prohibition [in the IG Act]
with respect to filing [with congressional committees] all the information which Congress
wants. We will be able to get it. There is no problem about it."), with S. REP. NO. 95-1071,
at 9–10 (stating that deletion from the final version of the IG Act of an express provision
requiring IGs to provide executive information to Congress upon request should allay fears
that "the [IG] could be used as a conduit of sensitive executive branch materials to
Congress"). But see id. at 28 ("The relevant committees and subcommittees of Congress
will undoubtedly be calling the [IG] to testify about the issues within his domain.").
184. S. REP. NO. 95-1071, at 7.
185. See Dugan & Rose, supra note 40 ("SIGTARP has asserted that ‘should Treasury
take actions that would impede our ability to independently conduct audits and
investigations, we would report such interference to Congress without delay.’").
186. See Steven G. Calabresi, Some Normative Arguments for the Unitary Executive, 48
ARK. L. REV. 23, 83 (1994) ("[Agency] [i]ndependence [from presidential authority], in
short, might be a way of increasing legislative power over agencies." (citing Lawrence
Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 115
(1994))).
187. See id. ("[Agency] independence can be understood as a form of [congressional]
aggrandizement.
Congress might make agencies independent not to create real
independence, but in order to diminish presidential authority over their operations precisely
in the interest of subjecting those agencies to the control of congressional committees."
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independence from the executive results in congressional aggrandizement,
the Court nonetheless has upheld the constitutionality of executive officials’
independence from the executive.188
However, the Court’s willingness to uphold executive officials’
independence from the executive branch is not boundless. In Bowsher,
Congress retained the removal power over an independent officer who
exercised executive power.189 The Court determined that this arrangement
violated the separation of powers because Congress essentially controlled
the exercise of executive power.190 In contrast, Congress retained no
removal power over the independent officer in Morrison who exercised
executive power.191 The Court concluded that, although the statute
restricted the President’s removal power over the officer, Congress neither
absorbed that stripped executive discretion nor controlled the exercise of
the executive power at issue.192 The question therefore becomes whether
(citing Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 186, at 115)). "[T]here are no ‘independent’
government actors in Washington, D.C." Id. at 83–84 (citing Steven G. Calabresi &
Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power to Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541
(1994)). "There are only actors influenced by the President, actors influenced by the
Congress and its committee shadow governments, and actors who are tugged one way or the
other. Anything that weakens the presidential set of incentives and controls strengthens
Congress and vice versa." Id. at 84. "There is no such thing as a truly independent agency
in Washington, D.C." Id. (citing Symposium, The Independence of Independent Agencies,
99 DUKE L.J. 215 (1988)).
188. See Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The Structural Constitution: Unitary
Executive, Plural Judiciary, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1153, 1173 (1992) ("Current constitutional
case law allows Congress to vest core executive power in officers and agencies
‘independent’ of the President . . . ." (footnote omitted)); Elena Kagan, Presidential
Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2250 (2001) ("Accepted constitutional doctrine
holds that Congress possesses broad, although not unlimited, power to structure the
relationship between the President and the administration, even to the extent of creating
independent agencies, whose heads have substantial protection from presidential removal.");
see also Calabresi, supra note 186, at 32–33 (noting the argument that "Congress has used
its power to structure the cabinet departments and agencies in ways that make it very
difficult for the President to oversee and control them, most especially by making certain
officers independent and removal only ‘for cause.’").
189. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 720 (1986).
190. See id. at 726 ("To permit the execution of the laws to be vested in an officer
answerable only to Congress would, in practical terms, reserve in Congress control over the
execution of the laws.").
191. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 694 (1988) ("[W]ith the exception of the
power of impeachment—which applies to all officers of the United States—Congress
retained for itself no powers of control or supervision over an independent counsel . . . .
Congress’ [sic] role . . . is limited to receiving reports or other information and oversight of
the independent counsel’s activities . . . .").
192. Id.
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the issue presented by SIGTARP’s independence from the executive branch
is more analogous to the issue confronted by the Court in Bowsher or in
Morrison.193
The fact that Congress has retained no role in SIGTARP’s removal,
but instead has allocated to the President the removal power, suggests
categorizing this issue into the Morrison class.194
However,
notwithstanding Congress’s relinquishment of the removal power, Congress
has fashioned SIGTARP’s relationship with the executive branch in such a
manner that SIGTARP is independent from the executive in virtually every
other aspect. SIGTARP reports only to Congress,195 transmits to Congress
TARP-related reports that are immune from executive comment,196 enjoys
essentially unrestricted access to all executive branch documents,197
responds to congressional requests to testify and to produce information
with respect to Treasury’s management of TARP,198 serves as the only
presidentially appointed executive official who speaks directly to Congress
without executive permission,199 and functions impervious to executive
supervision.200 SIGTARP’s strained relationship with the Treasury
Secretary,201 and its status as a mere cog in the machine of congressional
oversight of executive agencies,202 amplify the constitutional issues

193. Although the Court’s decisions on separation of powers issues exceed its decisions
in Bowsher and Morrison, these additional decisions need not be examined for purposes of
this precise analysis. Most specifically, the Court in Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295
U.S. 602 (1935), decided only that "illimitable power of removal is not possessed by the
President in respect of [quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial] officers." Id. at 629; see id. ("The
authority of Congress, in creating quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial agencies, to require
them to act in discharge of their duties independently of executive control cannot well be
doubted . . . ."). Furthermore, the Court in Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926), held
that a law that subordinated to congressional approval the President’s power to remove an
executive official violated the separation of powers. Id. at 176; see Morrison, 487 U.S. at
687 n.24 (stating that "the only issue actually decided in Myers was that ‘the President had
power to remove a post-master of the first class, without the advice and consent of the
Senate as required by an act of Congress’" (quoting Humphrey’s Ex’r, 295 U.S. at 626)).
194. See supra note 41 and accompanying text (noting that the President possesses the
power to remove IGs from office).
195. Supra notes 57–58 and accompanying text.
196. Supra note 57.
197. Supra notes 172–73 and accompanying text.
198. Supra note 183 and accompanying text.
199. Supra note 182 and accompanying text.
200. Supra notes 165, 167–68 and accompanying text.
201. Supra Part III.B.2.c.(2).
202. Supra note 180 and accompanying text.
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surrounding SIGTARP’s independence from the executive branch and its
close connection to Congress.
Hence, the issue becomes whether congressional assignment to the
President of the removal power over SIGTARP transmutes what would
otherwise be a Bowsher situation into a Morrison situation. In other words,
the inquiry is whether removal power is dispositive in determining the level
of congressional control over the execution of the laws that qualifies as a
violation of the separation of powers principle under Bowsher.203 Perhaps
Congress contemplated this very issue as it crafted the legislation that
conceived SIGTARP. Based on the foregoing analysis, Congress might
have relinquished to the executive branch the removal power over
SIGTARP in an attempt to comply facially with Bowsher,204 while
concomitantly retaining virtually all remaining control over SIGTARP in an
attempt to direct subtly the execution of EESA and its massive TARP
fund.205 If, as argued above, the Treasury Secretary must take action with
respect to TARP-related deficiencies identified by SIGTARP that are either
necessary or appropriate,206 and if Congress possesses all control, except for
removal power, over SIGTARP, then SIGTARP’s capacity to compel
executive action with respect to TARP borders on congressional execution
of EESA.
It is plausible, if not likely, that SIGTARP is susceptible to
congressional influence based both on SIGTARP’s independence from and
tense relationship with the executive branch207 and on SIGTARP’s loyalty
203. Cf. Calabresi, supra note 186, at 32–33 (noting the argument that Congress
employs its power "to structure . . . agencies in ways that make it very difficult for the
President to oversee and control them, most especially by making certain officers
independent").
204. See supra note 78 (discussing the Court’s decision in Bowsher, in which the Court
concluded that congressional retention of the removal power over an executive official
amounted to congressional control over the execution of the laws in violation of the
separation of powers).
205. See Calabresi & Rhodes, supra note 188, at 1173 ("Congress’s power to vest
executive functions in officers and agencies independent of the President allows it to bring
executive functions under its own potential domination and control, or at least to remove
them from the President’s domination and control."). "When Congress creates an
independent counsel or an independent agency to exercise an executive function, it transfers
executive power from the President, who is constitutionally independent of Congress and
responsive to a different national electoral constituency, to officers who are not
constitutionally independent of Congress." Id.
206. See supra Part III.B.2.b (arguing that EESA’s certification provision mandates
executive compliance with SIGTARP recommendations that are either necessary or
appropriate).
207. See supra Part III.B.2.c.(1)–(2) (examining SIGTARP’s independence from and
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to and connection with Congress.208 Pursuant to this prospect, SIGTARP
functions merely as a transmission belt on which Congress seeks to enforce
its intent with respect to the manner in which EESA and its massive TARP
fund are executed.209 Congress likely does not want to relinquish so easily
its control over its historic TARP program.210
If the President suspected congressional interference with Treasury’s
execution of EESA, he easily could exercise his removal power and dismiss
211
the individual serving at any given time as SIGTARP.
While this is true,
this fact does not alter the reality that the office endures. Even if the
President removed and replaced SIGTARP dozens of times, the same
susceptibility to congressional influence and control would exist with
respect to the new appointee based on the unchanging relationship dynamic
fashioned by EESA.
This situation veers dangerously close to qualifying as a Bowsher
issue. However, the Court in Morrison concluded that the President’s
minimal control over the independent counsel was adequate such that
Congress did not possess sufficient control over the independent executive
officer to transmute the case into a Bowsher issue.212 The President’s
tense relationship with the executive branch).
208. See supra Part III.B.2.c.(3) (examining SIGTARP’s loyalty to and connection with
Congress). SIGTARP’s vulnerability to congressional influence also stems from the fact
that SIGTARP lacks the self-defense mechanisms enjoyed by the President. See Calabresi &
Rhodes, supra note 188, at 1173 ("These [independent] officers, who may be called to
account by congressional committees or powerful members of Congress in oversight or
appropriations hearings, lack the weapons of self-defense that the Constitution gives to the
President." (footnote omitted)).
209. Cf. Kagan, supra note 188, at 2255 ("[Administrative] agencies . . . function as
little more than transmission belts for implementing legislative directives.").
210. See 155 CONG. REC. H3,849 (daily ed. Mar. 25, 2009) (statement of Rep. Erik
Paulsen) (expressing Congress’s feeling that "it is critical that we have the most stringent
oversight . . . possible" with respect to Treasury’s management of TARP funds); see id.
(statement of Rep. Jackie Speier) (advocating for "aggressive and competent oversight" of
Treasury’s expenditure of TARP funds).
211. See supra note 41 and accompanying text (noting that the President possesses the
power to remove IGs from office).
212. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 694 (1988) ("We observe . . . that this case
does not involve an attempt by Congress to increase its own powers at the expense of the
Executive Branch. Unlike some of our previous cases, most recently Bowsher v. Synar, this
case simply does not pose a ‘dange[r] of congressional usurpation of
Executive . . . functions.’" (citations omitted)). "This is not a case in which the power to
remove an executive official has been completely stripped from the President, thus providing
no means for the President to ensure the ‘faithful execution’ of the laws." Id. at 692.
"Rather, because the independent counsel may be terminated for ‘good cause,’ the
Executive, through the Attorney General, retains ample authority to assure that the counsel is
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supervisory authority over the independent counsel amounted to the power
to remove for cause (a more restrictive standard than the unlimited removal
power enjoyed by the President over SIGTARP)213 and the power to define
the independent counsel’s prosecutorial jurisdiction.214 Apart from these
dual sources of executive control, the independent counsel possessed "full
power and independent authority to exercise all investigative and
prosecutorial functions and powers of the Department of Justice, the
Attorney General, and any other officer or employee of the Department of
Justice."215 Furthermore, the same tension that characterizes the executive’s
relationship with SIGTARP also afflicted the executive’s relationship with
the independent counsel.216
Although Congress resigned the removal power over the independent
counsel to the executive branch, Congress retained various other methods
of oversight with respect to the counsel.217 The statute provided that the
independent counsel "may" transmit to Congress periodical reports on the
counsel’s activities.218 The statute mandated that the counsel inform
competently performing his or her statutory responsibilities in a manner that comports with
the provisions of the Act." Id.
213. See 28 U.S.C. § 596(a)(1) (2006) ("An independent counsel . . . may be removed
from office, other than by impeachment and conviction, only by the personal action of the
Attorney General and only for good cause, physical or mental disability, or any other
condition that substantially impairs the performance of such independent counsel’s duties."
(footnote omitted)).
214. See id. §§ 592(d), 593(b) (providing that the Attorney General’s application to the
special court for the appointment of an independent counsel "shall contain sufficient
information to assist the [court] . . . in defining that independent counsel’s prosecutorial
jurisdiction" and providing that the court "shall define that . . . jurisdiction" based upon the
Attorney General’s application).
215. Id. § 594(a).
216. See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 713 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Besides weakening the
Presidency by reducing the zeal of his staff, it must also be obvious that the institution of the
independent counsel enfeebles him more directly in his constant confrontations with
Congress, by eroding his public support."). "Nothing is so politically effective as the ability
to charge that one’s opponent and his associates are not merely wrongheaded, naive,
ineffective, but, in all probability, ‘crooks’ . . . . The statute’s highly visible procedures
assure, moreover, that unlike most investigations these will be widely known and
prominently displayed." Id. at 713–14.
217. See id. at 664–65 (majority opinion) (listing the methods of congressional
oversight pertaining to the independent counsel). "The ‘appropriate committees of the
Congress’ are given oversight jurisdiction in regard to the official conduct of an independent
counsel, and the counsel is required by the Act to cooperate with Congress in the exercise of
this jurisdiction." Id. at 664 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 595(a)(1)).
218. See id. ("An independent counsel may from time to time send Congress statements
or reports on his or her activities." (citing 28 U.S.C. § 595(a)(2))).
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Congress of "substantial and credible information which [the counsel]
receives . . . that may constitute grounds for an impeachment."219 Apart
from the power to request the Attorney General to apply for the
appointment of an independent counsel, the Court in Morrison ultimately
summarized Congress’s role under the statute as "limited to receiving
reports or other information and oversight of the independent counsel’s
activities, functions that we have recognized generally as being incidental
to the legislative function of Congress."220
It is clear from this overview of Morrison that the logistics of
executive independence and congressional supervision are very similar
between the independent counsel and SIGTARP.221 These similarities
could guide the conclusion that SIGTARP’s separation of powers issue fits
more neatly within the Morrison class, instead of within the Bowsher
class.222 However, although the specifics with respect to the independence
from the executive branch and the close supervisory relationship with
Congress are similar between SIGTARP and the independent counsel, the
functions served by and the ultimate effect of the executive powers wielded
by the separate officers are substantially distinct.
The independent counsel in Morrison exercised investigative,
prosecutorial, and law enforcement power.223 In sharp contrast, SIGTARP
possesses the power to recommend to the executive actions that, pursuant to
the statutory interpretation advocated above, must be implemented if
necessary or appropriate.224 SIGTARP possesses the power indirectly to
dictate the execution of a statute, a power not exercised by the independent
counsel in Morrison.225 In essence, SIGTARP may commandeer the whole
219. 28 U.S.C. § 595(c) (2006).
220. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 694 (1988) (citing McGrain v. Daugherty, 273
U.S. 135, 174 (1927)).
221. See supra Part III.B.2.c (discussing the specifics of SIGTARP’s independence
from the executive and its close relationship with Congress).
222. See supra notes 189–93 and accompanying text (discussing the distinguishing
features between Bowsher and Morrison).
223. See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 662 (stating that independent counsel statute grants to
the counsel "full power and independent authority to exercise all investigative and
prosecutorial functions and powers of the Department of Justice, the Attorney General, and
any other officer or employee of the Department of Justice" (citing 28 U.S.C. § 594(a))).
224. Supra Part III.B.2.b.
225. See supra note 223 and accompanying text (observing that the independent
counsel exercised investigative and prosecutorial authority, and not the power indirectly to
execute a statute). The Court in Morrison explicitly stated that the independent counsel did
not possess "any authority to formulate policy for the Government." Morrison, 487 U.S. at
671.
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executive machine to execute EESA according to SIGTARP’s
recommendations. Hence, the critical distinction between the power
wielded by SIGTARP and the power wielded by the independent counsel
likely removes the SIGTARP separation of powers issue from the confines
of the Morrison case.226 Moreover, SIGTARP’s ability to compel the
executive branch to execute EESA pursuant to recommendations that are
either necessary or appropriate, coupled with the fact that Congress
possesses significant control, supervision, and influence over SIGTARP,
likely conveys this case into the Bowsher realm.227
Under Bowsher, Congress may not reserve for itself an active role in
the execution of the laws.228 Congress’s transgression of this rule through
the SIGTARP dynamic229 constitutes an impermissible interference with the
executive’s constitutional right to take care that the laws be faithfully
executed and, thus, a violation of the separation of powers principle.230
IV. Solving SIGTARP’s Separation of Powers Problem Through
Compliance with Bowsher
Pursuant to the above analysis, Supreme Court precedent applied to
the separation of powers issue presented by the SIGTARP dynamic likely
results in a finding that Congress has transgressed the separation of powers
226. See supra notes 191–92 and accompany text (laying out the parameters of the
Morrison decision).
227. See supra notes 189–90 and accompanying text (setting forth the parameters of the
Bowsher decision).
228. See supra notes 78, 80 and accompanying text (summarizing the Court’s reasoning
and holding in Bowsher).
229. The fact that the Court might never entertain a constitutional challenge with
respect to the SIGTARP dynamic does not render this analysis moot. See In re Chrysler
LLC, 576 F.3d 108, 121 (2d Cir. 2009) (concluding that various citizen groups lacked
standing to challenge the constitutionality of the Treasury Secretary’s decision, pursuant to
EESA, to utilize TARP money to finance the sale of Chrysler’s assets); Texans Against
Governmental Waste and Unconstitutional Governmental Conduct v. U.S. Dep’t of
Treasury, 619 F. Supp. 2d 274, 282 (2009) (concluding that a citizen group lacked both
citizen and taxpayer standing to challenge the constitutionality of Treasury’s distribution of
TARP funds to automobile manufacturers pursuant to EESA). If a prerequisite to
scrutinizing the constitutionality of congressional legislation is that a challenge against that
legislation must wind up in court, then Congress essentially could shed all constitutional
restraints and act unfettered by public scrutiny as long as no one possesses standing to
challenge the constitutionality of that congressional action.
230. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 697 (1988) (finding that Congress may not
"impermissibly interfere" with the President’s constitutional duty to execute the laws).
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by reserving for itself an active role in the execution of EESA.231 The task
now becomes fashioning a solution to this separation of powers violation.
As discussed above, the Supreme Court has upheld congressionally
imposed executive reporting requirements.232 The Court has also upheld
congressional restriction of executive discretion as long as the stripped
discretion is not subsumed by Congress.233 Hence, EESA’s imposition of
executive accountability and EESA’s restriction of executive discretion
with respect to managing TARP may survive Supreme Court review.234
However, a solution must defuse the problematic element of congressional
usurpation of the stripped executive discretion.235
This congressional usurpation of executive discretion originates from
two separate elements of the SIGTARP dynamic. First, Congress retains a
high level of control over SIGTARP due to SIGTARP’s extreme
independence from the executive branch.236 Second, Congress’s control
over SIGTARP is exacerbated by the compulsory effect of EESA’s
certification provision.237Because EESA’s certification provision obligates
Treasury to comply with SIGTARP recommendations that are either
necessary or appropriate, Congress’s significant control over SIGTARP
amounts, in reality, to congressional control over the execution of EESA.238
Hence, the solution to the SIGTARP separation of powers issue must
neutralize each of these two problematic elements.

231.
232.
233.
234.

Supra Part III.B.2.d.
Supra Part III.B.2.a.(3).
Supra notes 147–50 and accompanying text.
See supra Parts III.B.2.a–b (examining EESA’s executive reporting requirement

and EESA’s mandate that Treasury comply with SIGTARP recommendations that are either
necessary or appropriate).
235. See supra note 150 and accompanying text (stating that the Court will tolerate
congressional restriction of executive discretion as long as the stripped discretion is not
subsumed by Congress).
236. See supra Part III.B.2.c (discussing SIGTARP’s extreme independence from the
executive branch).
237. See supra Part III.B.2.b (discussing the coercive language of EESA’s executive
certification provision).
238. See supra notes 194–230 and accompanying text (arguing that EESA’s
certification provision and Congress’s control over SIGTARP combine to produce a result of
congressional control over the execution of EESA).
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The first prong of the solution must diminish Congress’s control over
SIGTARP through increasing SIGTARP’s accountability to Treasury.239 All
other IGs, by way of the IG Act, are subject to the general supervision of and
must report directly to their respective agency heads.240 Furthermore, an
agency head may comment on the reports that an IG submits to Congress.241
However, SIGTARP evades these requirements through EESA’s failure to
provide expressly for these elements.242 Hence, Congress should amend
EESA to embrace these features of executive control.
Specifically, Congress should expressly incorporate into EESA §§ 3(a),
4(a), and 5 of the IG Act. This change will enhance Treasury’s supervisory
authority over SIGTARP in several ways. First, § 3(a) of the IG Act
mandates that each IG "shall report to and be under the general supervision of
the head of the establishment involved."243 Besides merely integrating into
EESA this section of the IG Act, Congress should expressly provide in EESA
that SIGTARP functions as an entity within Treasury and that the Treasury
Secretary serves as the agency head to whom SIGTARP is accountable.244
Second, § 4(a) of the IG Act enumerates certain duties and responsibilities
incumbent upon each IG, including the duty "to keep the head of such
establishment . . . fully and currently informed, by means of the reports
required by section 5."245 Third, as noted, § 5 specifies the content of the
reports that IGs must submit both to Congress and to their respective agency
heads.246 In addition to incorporating into EESA these three provisions from
the IG Act, Congress should amend EESA to authorize the Treasury
Secretary to comment on the reports that SIGTARP submits to Congress.247
239. See supra notes 186–87 and accompanying text (stating that increased
independence from the executive amounts, in reality, to increased control by Congress).
240. Supra notes 55–56 and accompanying text.
241. Supra note 57.
242. See supra notes 57–60 and accompanying text (noting the ambiguity in EESA with
respect to SIGTARP’s accountability to Treasury).
243. IG Act, 5 U.S.C. App. § 3(a).
244. See supra note 60 and accompanying text (noting that the vagueness of EESA’s
language leaves unclear whether SIGTARP actually belongs within the Treasury Department
and whether the Treasury Secretary serves as SIGTARP’s agency head).
245. IG Act § 4(a)(5).
246. Id. § 5.
247. See supra note 57 (observing that, with respect to all IGs except for SIGTARP, an
agency head may comment on the periodical reports that IGs are required to submit to
Congress). Allotting to the Treasury Secretary this power to comment on SIGTARP’s
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Through integrating these features into EESA, the executive branch retains
more control over SIGTARP, indirectly alleviating the sting of compulsion
contemplated by EESA’s executive certification requirement.248
B. Disarming the Compulsory Component of EESA’s Executive
Certification Requirement
Even with the above amendment, the specter of congressional control
over the execution of EESA (by means of the certification provision) is not
fully removed. As long as SIGTARP is still susceptible to a degree of
congressional influence or control, Congress may endeavor to control the
execution of EESA by exploiting SIGTARP’s capacity to bind the
executive branch through TARP-related recommendations that are either
necessary or appropriate.249 Hence, the compulsory component of EESA’s
executive certification provision must be defused in order to square the
SIGTARP dynamic with the separation of powers principle propounded by
the Court in Bowsher.250
As stated above, the problematic certification provision currently
provides: "The [Treasury] Secretary shall . . . (1) take action to address
deficiencies identified by a report or investigation of [SIGTARP] or other
auditor engaged by the TARP; or (2) certify to appropriate committees of
Congress that no action is necessary or appropriate."251
To disarm this provision’s compulsory component, Congress should
redraft the provision as follows:

congressional reports seems only proper considering that Congress’s departure from this
component with respect to SIGTARP constitutes a breach of the original compromise
between the legislative and executive branches that resulted in the passage of the IG Act.
See Gates & Knowles, supra note 53, at 502 ("The most important provisions of the
compromise [between Congress and the President with respect to the passage of the IG Act]
were to require that [IGs] report to Congress through the Secretary, who could not change
the content of the report but who could respond to it . . . .").
248. See supra notes 194–230 and accompanying text (arguing that EESA’s
certification provision and Congress’s control over SIGTARP combine to produce a result of
congressional control over the execution of EESA).
249. See supra notes 194–230 and accompanying text (arguing that EESA’s
certification provision and Congress’s control over SIGTARP combine to produce a result of
congressional control over the execution of EESA).
250. See supra notes 78, 80 and accompanying text (encapsulating the Court’s holding
in Bowsher, that Congress may not retain a role in the execution of its laws).
251. SIGTARP Act, Pub. L. No. 111-15, sec. 4(2)(f), § 121. For a discussion of the
compulsory element contemplated by the language of this provision, see supra Part III.B.2.b.
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The Treasury Secretary shall (1) consider deficiencies identified by a
report or investigation of SIGTARP or other auditor engaged by the
TARP; and (2) certify to appropriate committees of Congress with
respect to how the Secretary responds to such deficiencies. The
Secretary’s certifications to Congress shall be made available to the
public, subject to the requirements of other law or to other overriding
concerns such as national security, within twenty-four hours after
submission to Congress.

This proffered amendment eliminates the either/or ultimatum252
imposed upon the Secretary by the current provision and defuses the
compulsory element that converts the current clause into a weapon of
congressional control over Treasury’s execution of EESA.253 Pursuant to
this proposal, the statute’s certification requirement would no longer require
the Secretary to implement SIGTARP recommendations that are either
necessary or appropriate. Hence, Congress would lack the teeth to control
through SIGTARP the execution of EESA because SIGTARP no longer
wields the power to dictate Treasury’s management of TARP.
However, SIGTARP would continue to recommend TARP-related
actions to the Secretary, who would remain obliged to consider these
recommendations. Hence, this amendment satisfies Congress’s desire to
bring TARP-related deficiencies to Treasury’s attention. Furthermore,
Congress’s desire to remain informed with respect to how the executive
branch manages the multi-billion-dollar TARP fund is also satisfied
through the requirement that the Secretary certify to Congress with respect
to how the Secretary responds to SIGTARP recommendations.
The proposed amendment constitutes a workable254 solution that
balances both executive and legislative concerns and that facilitates the
SIGTARP dynamic’s compliance with Bowsher. With Treasury’s
increased control over SIGTARP,255 and SIGTARP’s inability to dictate
252. See supra note 84 and accompanying text (advancing the position that the
accountability dynamic created by EESA’s certification provision might impose upon the
Secretary a mild congressional threat in the form of an "either/or" dilemma, requiring the
Secretary either to comply with SIGTARP’s recommendations or to justify to Congress his
refusal to comply with SIGTARP’s recommendations).
253. See supra notes 194–230 and accompanying text (arguing that EESA’s
certification provision and Congress’s control over SIGTARP combine to produce a result of
congressional control over the execution of EESA).
254. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson,
J., concurring) (accounting for how "practice will integrate the dispersed powers into a
workable government").
255. See supra Part IV.B (proposing an amendment to EESA that reduces Congress’s
control over SIGTARP by subjecting SIGTARP to increased executive supervision).
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any longer the execution of EESA through proffering necessary or
appropriate recommendations,256 the proposed amendment divests Congress
of its capacity to control indirectly the execution of EESA.257 Therefore,
the change enables the SIGTARP dynamic to comply with Bowsher’s rule
that Congress may not retain a role in the execution of its laws.258
C. Executive Accountability to the People with Respect to Treasury’s
Responses to SIGTARP Recommendations
As advanced above, the proposed amendment requires that Treasury’s
certification to Congress be made available to the public.259 In contrast,
EESA’s current certification provision embraces the notion of executive
accountability to Congress.260 Although the Court has upheld executive
reporting requirements and other forms of congressionally imposed tools of
executive accountability,261 the Founders intended "[t]he people [to be] the
only censors of their governors."262
All governmental power in America’s republic emanates from the
people, the sovereign entity.263 Because the people are the repository of all
256. See supra Part IV.B (proposing an amendment to EESA that removes from the
executive certification requirement the compulsory component that empowered SIGTARP to
direct the execution of EESA through submitting TARP-related recommendations that are
either necessary or appropriate).
257. See supra notes 194–230 and accompanying text (arguing that EESA’s
certification provision and Congress’s control over SIGTARP combine to produce a result of
congressional control over the execution of EESA).
258. See supra notes 78, 80 and accompanying text (summarizing Bowsher and its rule
with respect to the separation of powers principle).
259. See supra Part IV.B (setting forth the proposed amendment).
260. See supra Part III.B.2.a (discussing how EESA compels executive accountability
to Congress).
261. See supra Part III.B.2.a.(3) (noting the Court’s record of upholding executive
reporting requirements).
262. ALLISON ET AL., supra note 27, at 575 (quoting 6 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON 57 (Albert Ellery Bergh ed., 1907)); see also Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714,
722 (1986) ("[T]he President, under Article II, is responsible not to the Congress, but to the
people, subject only to impeachment proceedings which are exercised by the two Houses as
representatives of the people." (citing U.S. CONST., art. II, § 4)).
263. See ALLISON ET AL., supra note 27, at 577 ("I consider the people who constitute a
society or nation as the source of all authority in that nation." (quoting 3 THE WRITINGS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 262, at 227)); id. ("All authority belongs to the people."
(quoting 10 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 27, at 190)); FISHER, supra
note 1, at 1 ("To be worthy of the name, a constitution embodies a philosophy of
government with sovereignty resting with the people, not with elected officials or judges.");
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governmental power, the public officers selected by the people to
administer the government are accountable only to the people for the
discharge of their duties.264 The Founders intended the three branches of
government to stand independent and to act for themselves, unfettered by
accountability to the other branches.265
In fact, some Founders believed that not even the Supreme Court was
intended to possess the power to determine the constitutionality of actions
or laws vis-à-vis the other branches.266 Instead, some Founders stated, the
JAY A. PARRY ET AL., THE REAL GEORGE WASHINGTON 754 (1991) ("The power under the
Constitution will always be in the people. It is entrusted for certain defined purposes, and
for a certain limited period, to representatives of their own choosing; and whenever it is
executed contrary to their interest, . . . their servants can, and undoubtedly will, be recalled."
(quoting 29 THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 311 (John C. Fitzpatrick ed., 1931–
44))).
264. See DAVID BARTON, ORIGINAL INTENT: THE COURTS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND
RELIGION 262 (5th ed. 2008) ("All power residing originally in the people and being derived
from them, the several magistrates and officers of government vested with authoritywhether Legislative, Executive, or Judicial—are their substitutes and agents and are at all
times accountable to them." (quoting MASS. CONST. of 1780, part I, art. V)).
265. See ALLISON ET AL., supra note 27, at 497 (quoting Thomas Jefferson as stating
that the "Constitution intended that the three great branches of the government should be
coordinate, and independent of each other. As to acts, therefore, which are to be done by
either, it has given no control to another branch" (quoting 11 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON, supra note 262, at 213)). The Constitution relaxes the independence of the three
branches only through specifically enumerated checks and balances. See infra note 283
(noting that the partial mixture of powers contemplated by the concept of checks and
balances comports with the separation of powers doctrine only where this commingling of
powers is specifically identified by the Constitution).
266. See, e.g., ALLISON ET AL., supra note 27, at 497 (quoting Thomas Jefferson as
stating that "nothing in the Constitution has given [judges] a right to decide [on the validity
of a certain sedition law] for the executive, more than to the executive to decide for them.
Both magistrates are equally independent in the sphere of action assigned to them" (quoting
11 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 262, at 50)). In a letter to Abigail
Adams, Jefferson stated:
The judges, believing the [sedition] law Constitutional, had a right to pass a
sentence of fine and imprisonment, because the power was placed in their hands
by the Constitution. But the executive, believing the law to be unconstitutional,
were bound to remit the execution of it, because that power has been confided to
them by the Constitution. That instrument meant that its coordinate branches
should be checks on each other. But the opinion which gives to the judges the
right to decide which laws are Constitutional and what not, not only for
themselves in their own sphere of action, but for the legislature and executive
also in their spheres, would make the judiciary a despotic branch.

Id.
Elsewhere, Jefferson declared that the Constitution "did not intend to give the
judiciary . . . control over the executive . . . . I have long wished for a proper occasion to
have the gratuitous opinion in Marbury v. Madison brought before the public, and

SIGTARP AND THE EXECUTIVE-LEGISLATIVE CLASH

435

Constitution contemplates each branch interpreting the Constitution for
itself, within its own sphere, and determining the constitutionality of its
own actions.267 Who, then, checks the independent discretion exercised by
each branch? The Founders intended for the people to fill this role.
Thomas Jefferson stated:
When the legislative or executive functionaries act unconstitutionally,
they are responsible to the people in their elective capacity. The
exemption of the judges from that is quite dangerous enough. I know no
safe depository of the ultimate powers of the society but the people
themselves; and if we think them not enlightened enough to exercise
their control with a wholesome discretion, the remedy is not to take it
from them but to inform their discretion by education. This is the true
corrective of abuses of Constitutional power.268

This great principle—the people as the protectors of the
Constitution—serves as the foundation for the amendment’s provision that
Treasury’s certifications to Congress be made available to the public.269 By
imposing upon the executive branch accountability to the people (rather
denounced as not law." Id. (quoting 11 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note
262, at 213).
267. See id. at 498 ("My construction of the Constitution . . . is that each department is
truly independent of the others, and has an equal right to decide for itself what is the
meaning of the Constitution in the cases submitted to its action . . . ." (quoting 15 THE
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 262, at 212)). Jefferson also declared:
The question whether the judges are invested with exclusive authority to decide
on the Constitutionality of a law has been heretofore a subject of consideration
with me in the exercise of official duties. Certainly there is not a word in the
Constitution which has given that power to them more than to the executive or
legislative branches. Questions of property, of character, and of crime being
ascribed to the judges through a definite course of legal proceeding, laws
involving such questions belong, of course, to them; and as they decide on them
ultimately and without appeal, they of course decide for themselves. The
Constitutional validity of the law or laws again prescribing executive action, and
to be administered by that branch ultimately and without appeal, the executive
must decide for themselves also whether, under the Constitution, they are valid
or not. So also as to laws governing the proceedings of the legislature, that body
must judge for itself the Constitutionality of the law, and equally without appeal
or control from its coordinate branches. And, in general, that branch which is to
act ultimately and without appeal on any law is the rightful expositor of the
validity of the law, uncontrolled by the opinions of the other coordinate
authorities.
Id. at 497–98 (quoting 9 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 27, at 517).
268. Id. at 499 (quoting 15 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 262, at
277); see also BARTON, supra note 264, at 282 (noting that "the people and their use of the
ballot box was the check" upon abuses by the governmental branches).
269. See supra Part IV.B (setting forth the proposed amendment).
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than accountability to Congress) with respect to its execution of EESA, the
amendment seeks to restore the people to their proper place as the "true
corrective of abuses of Constitutional power."270 If the executive
irrationally spurns SIGTARP’s recommendations under the amendment
proposed above, it is the people who should rectify this choice. Congress’s
unwillingness to relinquish control over its multi-billion dollar economic
bailout program, though superficially justifiable, finds no sympathy in the
Constitution’s separation of powers principle. Therefore, Congress’s
misguided efforts to supervise the execution of EESA must bow to the
separation of powers and to the people’s prerogative to ensure the proper
execution of the laws.
V. The People: A Principle for Preserving the Separation of Powers in
Future Crises
In addition merely to analyzing a specific legal issue and to offering
proposals for change with respect to that isolated issue, this Note advances
a principle for sustaining the separation of powers principle in an age of
American history when historic financial and societal crises will likely elicit
more bold legislative responses.271 Just as accountability to the people
emerges as an element of the solution with respect to the SIGTARP issue,
accountability to the people also applies within the context of the separation
of powers principle. However, before describing the people’s central role
in upholding this principle, we must first consider briefly the grave
importance of preserving the separation of powers within this nation’s
government.
A. A Brief Examination into the Critical Importance of Preserving the
Separation of Powers
The separation of powers principle serves as the cornerstone of the
United States’ constitutional form of government—a governmental formula
that has triggered an age of freedom and of technological and societal
advancement the likes of which no other government on earth has ever
270. ALLISON ET AL., supra note 27, at 499 (quoting 15 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON, supra note 262, at 277).
271. See supra pp. 384–85 (stating the intention to advance a principle for preserving
the separation of powers during future crises that may arise as a result of America’s
uncertain future).
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produced.272 A government that has engendered such coveted results
establishes itself a model to be emulated and demands perpetuation.273 The
separation of powers principle, as the foundational ingredient in America’s
successful governmental formula, likewise necessitates perpetuation.274
272. See generally W. CLEON SKOUSEN, THE FIVE THOUSAND YEAR LEAP: TWENTYEIGHT IDEAS THAT CHANGED THE WORLD (Nat’l Ctr. for Constitutional Studies, 5th prtg.
1987) (1981). "Colonies of civilized human beings have been emerging and disappearing on
the continental fringes of the Planet Earth for over 5,000 years. Each of these ganglia of
civilized mankind had similar aspirations, but none fulfilled them. At least, not in their
fullest dimensions." Id. at 1. "Some built cities for over a million people that now lie buried
in the skeletal debris of the Sahara sands." Id. "Others built cities that were even larger—in
Asia and South America—but snakes, rodents, and entangled vines are about all that live
today in the ghostly grandeur of their ruined past." Id.
"One need not be an American citizen to feel a sense of genuine pride in the fantastic
list of achievements which bubbled up from the massive melting pot of humanity that
swarmed to the shores of this new land and contributed to its mighty leap in technical,
political, and economic achievement." Id. at 3. "The spirit of freedom which moved out
across the world in the 1800s was primarily inspired by the fruits of freedom in the United
States." Id. "The climate of free-market economics allowed science to thrive in an
explosion of inventions and technical discoveries which, in merely 200 years, gave the world
the gigantic new power resources of harnessed electricity, the internal combustion engine, jet
propulsion, exotic space vehicles, and all the wonders of nuclear energy." Id.
"Communications were revolutionized, first by the telegraph, then the telephone, followed
by radio and television. The whole earth was explored from pole to pole—even the depths
of the sea." Id. "Then men left the earth in rocket ships and actually walked on the moon.
They sent up a space plane that could be maneuvered and landed back on the earth." Id.
"The average length of life was doubled; the quality of life was tremendously enhanced." Id.
"Homes, food, textiles, communications, transportation, central heating, central cooling,
world travel, millions of books, a high literacy rate, schools for everybody, surgical miracles,
medical cures for age-old diseases, entertainment at the touch of a switch, and instant news,
twenty-four hours a day. That was the story." Id. at 3–4.
"Of course, all of this did not happen just in America, but it did flow out primarily from
the swift current of freedom and prosperity which the American Founders turned loose into
the spillways of human progress all over the world. In 200 years, the human race had made
a 5,000-year leap." Id. at 4.
273. See generally W. CLEON SKOUSEN, THE MAKING OF AMERICA (2d ed., rev. 1986)
[hereinafter SKOUSEN, AMERICA]. "[T]here has been a need to review the history and
development of the making of America in order to recapture the brilliant precepts which
made Americans the first free people in modern times." Id. at ix. "It would be a disastrous
loss to all humanity if these great principles were allowed to become neglected or lost." Id.
274. See BARTON, supra note 264, at 278 (establishing the importance of "maintaining
the separation of powers"); see also Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462
U.S. 919, 957–58 (1983) ("To preserve those checks, and maintain the separation of powers,
the carefully defined limits on the power of each Branch must not be eroded."); Humphrey’s
Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 629 (1935) ("The fundamental necessity of maintaining
each of the three general departments of government entirely free from the control or
coercive influence, direct or indirect, of either of the others, has often been stressed and is
hardly open to serious question."). Thomas Jefferson warned, "[T]o preserve the republican
form and principles of our Constitution and [to] cleave to the salutary distribution of powers
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To grasp the critical importance of protecting the separation of powers,
we must first comprehend the Founders’ reasons for inculcating this
principle into the constitutional government that they fashioned. The
purpose of government is to secure to individuals their rights and freedoms
such that these individuals are able lawfully to pursue life, liberty, and
happiness unrestrained by the interference of others.275 Citizens surrender
certain rights for the public good and entrust their leaders with the power
both to protect their retained rights and to govern the affairs of the
civilization in the way that best facilitates the pursuit of happiness.276
However, human nature is afflicted by the tendency to abuse power.277
Hence, the allocation to mortals of the authority to govern must be
accompanied by safeguards sufficiently potent to counteract the tendency of
leaders to abuse their power and to oppress those over whom they
preside.278
which [the Constitution] has established . . . . are the two sheet anchors of our Union. If
driven from either, we shall be in danger of foundering." BARTON, supra note 264, at 278
(quoting Letter from Thomas Jefferson to William Johnson (June 12, 1823), in 4 MEMOIR,
CORRESPONDENCE, AND MISCELLANIES 375 (Thomas Jefferson Randolph ed., 1830)).
275. See generally EZRA TAFT BENSON, THE PROPER ROLE OF GOVERNMENT (1968).
See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) ("We hold these truths to be
self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with
certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness.
That, to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men . . . ."); ALLISON ET AL.,
supra note 27, at 463 ("It is to secure our rights that we resort to government at all." (quoting
7 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 27, at 4)); see also 1 THE FOUNDERS’
CONSTITUTION, supra note 4, at 108 (observing that "the happiness of society is the end of
government" (quoting 4 PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS 86 (Robert J. Taylor ed., 1977))). "From
this principle it will follow, that the form of government, which communicates ease,
comfort, security, or in one word happiness to the greatest number of persons, and in the
greatest degree, is the best." Id. (quoting 4 PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS, supra, at 86).
276. See JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 368 (Peter Laslett ed., 2d ed.
1967) (1690) ("[B]ecause no political Society can . . . subsist without having in itself the
Power to preserve the Property . . . of all those of that Society, . . . there only is political
Society where every one of the Members hath quitted this natural Power, resigned it up into
the Hands of the Community . . . .").
277. See 1 MONTESQUIEU, supra note 109, at 161 ("[C]onstant experience shows us that
every man invested with power is apt to abuse it, and to carry his authority as far as it will
go."); see also BARTON, supra note 264, at 277 ("It was the lesson of history that the
tendency of human nature was to accrue and abuse power . . . ."). In his famed Farewell
Address, George Washington noted "the love of power, and proneness to abuse it, which
predominates in the human heart." PARRY ET AL., supra note 263, at 787 (quoting 35 THE
WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, supra note 263, at 228).
278. PARRY ET AL., supra note 263, at 787 (recognizing, due to the tendency of those
with power to abuse that power, the "necessity of reciprocal checks in the exercise of
political power" (quoting 35 THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, supra note 263, at
228); see also 1 MONTESQUIEU, supra note 109, at 161 ("To prevent this abuse, it is
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The Founders resolved that the three basic powers of government279
must not unite in the hands of one entity, for a single entity possessing all
three governmental powers would surely fall prey to the tendency to abuse
that power, typifying the very definition of tyranny.280 To guard against
power’s inclination to consolidate, the Founders undertook to structure a
government in which the three distinct powers were separated.281 However,
necessary from the very nature of things that power should be a check to power."). William
Grayson, a Revolutionary War officer and a Virginia lawyer, stated, "Power ought to have
such checks and limitations as to prevent bad men from abusing it. It ought to be granted on
a supposition that men will be bad; for it may be eventually so." See SKOUSEN, AMERICA,
supra note 273, at 188 (quoting 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE
ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 563 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 1901)); see also 1 THE
FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION, supra note 4, at 314 (asserting the importance of "presuming the
worst" and assuming "that men in Power may be unrighteous" (quoting 9 W.B. GWYN, THE
MEANING OF THE SEPARATION OF POWERS: AN ANALYSIS OF THE DOCTRINE FROM ITS ORIGIN
TO THE ADOPTION OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 131 (1965))). In a moving plea for
the establishment of a government that defends against the human proclivity for abusing
power, Thomas Jefferson declared:
Nor should our assembly be deluded by the integrity of their own purposes, and
conclude that these unlimited powers will never be abused, because themselves
are not disposed to abuse them. They should look forward to a time, and that
not a distant one, when corruption in this, as in the country from which we
derive our origin, will have seized the heads of government, and be spread by
them through the body of the people; when they will purchase the voices of the
people, and make them pay the price. Human nature is the same on every side
of the Atlantic, and will be alike influenced by the same causes. The time to
guard against corruption and tyranny, is before they shall have gotten hold on
us. It is better to keep the wolf out of the fold, than to trust to drawing his teeth
and talons after he shall have entered.
Id. at 320 (quoting THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA 121 (William
Peden ed., 1954)).
279. See 1 MONTESQUIEU, supra note 109, at 162–63 ("In every government there are
three sorts of power: the legislative; the executive . . . ; and the . . . judiciary . . . .").
280. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 47 (James Madison), supra note 27, at 336 ("The
accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands, whether
of one, a few, or many, and whether hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may justly be
pronounced the very definition of tyranny."); 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 375 (4th ed., 1891) ("In absolute governments the
whole executive, legislative, and judicial powers are . . . exclusively confined to a single
individual; and such a form of government is denominated a despotism . . . . If the same
powers are exclusively confided to a few persons, . . . the government may be appropriately
denominated a[] . . . despotic aristocracy."); see also BARTON, supra note 264, at 277 ("It
was the lesson of history that . . . tyranny occurred whenever government power was
consolidated in one branch.").
281. See U.S. CONST., arts. I–III (allocating among the three separate branches the
legislative, executive, and judicial powers of the federal government); 1 THE FOUNDERS’
CONSTITUTION, supra note 4, at 311 (observing that the remedy against "the kind of
arbitrary, tyrannical rule against which the governed had to be protected" lay in a "separation
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the Framers recognized that mere parchment barriers as recorded in the
Constitution were insufficient to maintain in practice the degree of
separation that was necessary to combat tyranny.282 For this reason, the
Founders instituted "auxiliary precautions" in the form of internal checks
and balances to preserve the equilibrium of power among the three
branches.283
of [the three] governmental functions" (citing Max Radin, The Doctrine of the Separation of
Powers in Seventeenth Century Controversies, 86 U. PA. L. REV. 842, 855–86 (1938))); see
also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 121 (1976) ("The men who met in Philadelphia in the
summer of 1787 were practical statesmen, experienced in politics, who viewed the
separation of powers as a vital check against tyranny."). Thomas Jefferson stated:
The concentrating these [three governmental powers] in the same hands is
precisely the definition of despotic government . . . . An elective despotism was
not the government we fought for; but one which should not only be founded on
free principles, but in which the powers of government should be so divided and
balanced among several bodies of magistracy, as that no one could transcend
their legal limits, without being effectually checked and restrained by the others.
For this reason that convention, which passed the ordinance of government, laid
its foundation on this basis, that the legislative, executive and judiciary
departments should be separate and distinct, so that no person should exercise
the powers of more than one of them at the same time.
1 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION, supra note 4, at 319–20 (emphasis omitted) (quoting
JEFFERSON, supra note 278, at 120–21).
282. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 48 (James Madison), supra note 27, at 347 ("[A] mere
demarcation on parchment of the constitutional limits of the several departments, is not a
sufficient guard against those encroachments which lead to a tyrannical concentration of all
the powers of government in the same hands."); see also 1 STORY, supra note 280, at 383
(noting the inadequacy of mere parchment barriers in maintaining separation among the
three branches of governmental power). Story observed:
Power . . . is of an encroaching nature, and it ought to be effectually restrained
from passing the limits assigned to it. Having separated the three great
departments by a broad line from each other, the difficult task remains to
provide some practical means for the security of each against the meditated or
occasional invasions of the others. Is it sufficient to declare on parchment in the
Constitution, that each shall remain, and neither shall usurp the functions of the
other? No one, well read in history in general, or even in our own history during
the period of the existence of our State constitutions, will place much reliance on
such declarations.
Id.
283. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison), supra note 27, at 356 (emphasizing
the need for "auxiliary precautions" as internal controls on government); see also JOHN L.
FITZGERALD, CONGRESS AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS 27 (1986) ("The framers believed
that if they could divide the national authority into three autonomous branches, . . . and if
each of these branches possessed a particular function with built-in defenses and powers to
prevent dominance by another branch, then these provisions, . . . would . . . prevent the . . .
government from achieving ascendancy over its citizens." (citing A. VANDERBILT, THE
DOCTRINE OF THE SEPARATION OF P OWERS AND ITS P RESENT-DAY SIGNIFICANCE 48 (1953)));
1 STORY, supra note 280, at 384 ("[I]n order to preserve in full vigor the constitutional
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barrier between each department, when they are entirely separated, it is obviously
indispensable that each should possess equally, and in the same degree, the means of selfprotection."); Calabresi & Rhodes, supra note 188, at 1155–56 ("The genius of the American
Constitution lies in its use of structural devices to preserve individual liberty . . . . By thus
fragmenting and institutionalizing conflict [through checks and balances], the new political
science of the eighteenth century sought to oblige a government by men and over men ‘to
control itself.’" (emphasis omitted)).
In an oft-quoted passage, James Madison penned:
But the great security against a gradual concentration of the several powers in
the same department, consists in giving to those who administer each
department the necessary constitutional means and personal motives to resist
encroachments of the others. The provision for defense must in this, as in all
other cases, be made commensurate to the danger of attack. Ambition must be
made to counteract ambition. The interest of the man must be connected with
the constitutional rights of the place. It may be a reflection on human nature,
that such devices should be necessary to control the abuses of government. But
what is government itself, but the greatest of all reflections on human nature? If
men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern
men, neither external nor internal controls on government would be necessary.
In framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the
great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the
governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself. A dependence on the
people is, no doubt, the primary control on the government; but experience has
taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison), supra note 27, at 356.
The drafters of the Constitution inserted these checks and balances by distributing to
each department certain "negatives" over the other branches. See 1 STORY, supra note 280,
at 381 (observing that the occasional mixture of powers contemplated by the scheme of
checks and balances set forth in the Constitution involves only the "power of rejecting,
rather than resolving, . . . [such that no branch] has . . . any power of doing wrong, but
merely of preventing wrong from being done"). Naturally, then, the Constitution does not
institute an absolute separation of powers among the three branches. See THE F EDERALIST
NO. 47 (James Madison), supra note 27, at 339 (looking to state constitutions and observing
that "there is not a single instance in which the several departments of power have been kept
absolutely separate and distinct . . . . [, due to the] impossibility and inexpediency of
avoiding any mixture whatever of these departments"); id. NO. 48 (James Madison) at 343
("[T]he political apothegm . . . does not require that the legislative, executive, and judiciary
departments should be wholly unconnected . . . . [U]nless these departments be so far
connected and blended as to give to each a constitutional control over the others, the [proper]
degree of separation . . . can never in practice be duly maintained."); id. NO. 51 (James
Madison) at 355 (asserting the importance of "so contriving the interior structure of the
government as that its several constituent parts may, by their mutual relations, be the means
of keeping each other in their proper places"); id. at 356 ("[T]he great security against a
gradual concentration of the several powers in the same department, consists in giving to
those who administer each department the necessary constitutional means and personal
motives to resist encroachments of the others."); see also SKOUSEN, AMERICA, supra note
273, at 187–90 (discussing the practicality of checks and balances).
Rather, the crux of the separation of powers principle lies in the proposition that "the
powers properly belonging to one of the departments ought not to be directly and completely
administered by either of the other departments." THE FEDERALIST NO. 48 (James Madison),

442

68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 375 (2011)

In short, governments are installed in societies to guarantee to
individual citizens their basic rights.284 In order to secure to citizens their
liberty, government must be apportioned the power that is necessary to
function effectively.285 However, human nature suffers from the tendency
to abuse power.286 Because government entails mortals governing mortals,
government must be structured to neutralize the human predisposition to
abuse power.287 The Founders grasped these important truths and crafted
their government accordingly. The separation of powers and the system of
checks and balances comprise the governmental structure implemented by
the Framers for the purpose of counteracting the human tendency to abuse
power such that individual liberty could be preserved.288
Hence, because the purpose of America’s government is to secure to
its citizens their rights, it is absolutely critical to preserve the internal
structure designed by the Framers, or else governmental power will
supra note 27, at 343; see also id. NO. 47 (James Madison) at 338 ("[W]here the whole
power of one department is exercised by the same hands which possess the whole power of
another department, the fundamental principles of a free constitution are subverted."); id. at
339–40 ("It goes no farther than to prohibit any one of the entire departments from
exercising the powers of another department. In the very Constitution to which it is
prefixed, a partial mixture of powers has been admitted.").
However, this partial mixture of powers comports with the separation of powers
doctrine only where such commingling of powers is specifically identified by the
Constitution. See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 116 (1926) ("[T]he reasonable
construction of the Constitution must be that the branches should be kept separate in all
cases in which they were not expressly blended, and the Constitution should be expounded
to blend them no more than it affirmatively requires." (citing 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 497
(Joseph Gales ed., 1834))); ALLISON ET AL., supra note 27, at 623 ("The principle of the
Constitution is that of a separation of legislative, executive, and judiciary functions, except
in cases specified." (quoting 7 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 27, at 108
(emphasis added))).
Some of the explicit checks and balances enumerated by the Constitution include the
President’s legislative veto power, the Senate’s power over executive appointments, and the
judiciary’s tenure in office during good behavior. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 7 (allocating to the
President the power to veto congressional legislation); id., art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (allotting to the
Senate the power to affirm or to reject presidential appointments of lower executive
officials); id., art. III, § 1 (providing that the judges of the Supreme Court shall hold their
offices during good behavior); see also 1 STORY, supra note 280, at 390–91 (detailing the
checks and balances itemized by the Constitution). The Constitution enumerates a total of
seventeen checks between the three branches of government. SKOUSEN, AMERICA, supra
note 273, at 188.
284. Supra note 275 and accompanying text.
285. Supra note 276 and accompanying text.
286. Supra note 277 and accompanying text.
287. Supra note 278 and accompanying text.
288. Supra notes 278–83 and accompanying text.
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centralize and the very government intended to protect freedom will be
wielded in the hands of tyrants as a powerful weapon for the destruction of
freedom.289 The parchment guarantees of the Constitution are meaningless
if the governmental structure corrodes.290 The separation of powers as
established by the Constitution must be preserved, not merely for
separation’s sake, but for the sake of preserving for ourselves and for our
posterity the liberty291 for which Americans have fought and died.292
B. The People as the True Guardians of the Separation of Powers
As our nation plunges into an era of economic uncertainty, Congress
likely will respond to future crises by undertaking more bold, innovative
legislation.293 Hasty legislative responses (such as Congress’s passage of
EESA) to pressing national problems can disregard constitutional norms
that would otherwise govern more deliberative legislative action.294
289. See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 730 (1986) ("The Framers recognized that, in
the long term, structural protections against abuse of power were critical to preserving
liberty.").
290. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 697 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Without
a secure structure of separated powers, our Bill of Rights would be worthless, as are the bills
of rights of many nations of the world that have adopted, or even improved upon, the mere
words of ours."). It is because "the mere words of a Bill of Rights are not self-effectuating,"
asserted Justice Scalia, that the separation of powers structure is the "central guarantee of a
just Government." Id. at 697–98.
291. See U.S. CONST., pmbl. (declaring that the Constitution is established to "secure
the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity").
292. See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 727 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The purpose of the
separation and equilibration of powers in general, . . . was not merely to assure effective
government but to preserve individual freedom."); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 124 (1976)
("The principle of separation of powers was not simply an abstract generalization in the
minds of the Framers: it was woven into the documents that they drafted in Philadelphia in
the summer of 1787.").
293. See supra notes 30–31, 33 and accompanying text (noting the likelihood both of
future crises and future legislative experimentation in response to these crises).
294. See Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 758–59 (Stevens, J., concurring) (discussing how
inventive congressional legislation in response to a "national budget crisis" violated the
separation of powers); see also FISHER, supra note 1, at 292 (warning against "shortsighted
reactions to immediate events and the failure to take into account the longer view").
The Court in Chadha recognized that the limitations imposed by the separation of
powers upon the governmental branches likely would cause inconvenience and inhibit hasty
responses. Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 959 (1983). The
Court stated:
The choices we discern as having been made in the Constitutional Convention
impose burdens on governmental processes that often seem clumsy, inefficient,
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However, even the most pressing national crises do not justify sacrificing
the separation of powers principle.295 As the sovereign entity guarding
America’s governmental structure,296 the people must ensure that the
separation of powers is not "swept into the dustbin of repudiated
constitutional principles."297 Although the Court has attempted to fill this
role,298 this function belongs by right to the people.299
America’s citizens must fulfill their duty as the guardians of America’s
freedom experiment.300 This trust imposes upon the people an obligation to
educate themselves concerning the separation of powers and other
constitutional principles,301 enabling them to gauge the constitutionality of
governmental action and to discern departures from constitutional norms so
even unworkable, but those hard choices were consciously made by men who
had lived under a form of government that permitted arbitrary governmental acts
to go unchecked. There is no support in the Constitution or decisions of this
Court for the proposition that the cumbersomeness and delays often encountered
in complying with explicit Constitutional standards may be avoided, either by
the Congress or by the President. With all the obvious flaws of delay,
untidiness, and potential for abuse, we have not yet found a better way to
preserve freedom than by making the exercise of power subject to the carefully
crafted restraints spelled out in the Constitution.
Id. (citations omitted).
295. See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 758–59 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring)
("Neither the unquestioned urgency of the national budget crisis nor the Comptroller
General’s proud record of professionalism and dedication provides a justification [for
violating the separation of powers]."); see also Chadha, 462 U.S. at 944–45 ("[T]he fact that
a given law or procedure is efficient, convenient, and useful in facilitating functions of
government, standing alone, will not save it if it is contrary to the Constitution . . . . [E]ven
useful ‘political inventions’ are subject to the demands of the Constitution . . . ."). For an
examination of the critical importance of preserving the separation of powers principle, see
supra Part V.A.
296. See supra notes 263, 268 and accompanying text (explaining that the people are
the repository of all power in America’s constitutional republic and that the duty to preserve
this republic therefore devolves on the people).
297. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 725 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
298. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (seizing the judicial
review power).
299. See supra note 268 and accompanying text (stating that the people serve as the
"true corrective of abuses of Constitutional power").
300. See Ronald Reagan, President of the United States, Speech at the Investiture of
Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Associate Justice Antonin Scalia at the White House
(Sept. 26, 1986), in ORIGINALISM: A QUARTER-CENTURY OF DEBATE 97 (Steven G. Calabresi
ed., 2007) ("[W]e the people are the ultimate defenders of freedom.").
301. See ALLISON ET AL., supra note 27, at 578 ("[I]f we think [the people] not
enlightened enough to exercise their control [over government] with a wholesome discretion,
the remedy is not to take it from them, but to inform their discretion by education." (quoting
15 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 262, at 278)).
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that they can quickly rectify these deviations through the political process.302
It is the "people—not the courts—[who] must control the destiny of the
nation."303
Lawmakers and government officials must remember that they serve the
people.304 They must confine their actions within the boundaries set by the
Constitution, regardless of crises that present seemingly new problems.
However, those who wield governmental power can fail to observe the
limitations imposed upon them by the Constitution.305 As such, an entity
detached from the fierce power struggle among the governmental branches
must assume the role of ensuring that government observes the limits
imposed by the separation of powers principle.
The American people must unite in relearning the truths underlying the
constitutional structure so that they are able to preserve the separation of
powers through holding governmental leaders accountable for their actions
based on the standard set forth by the Constitution, the supreme law of the
land.306 President Ronald Reagan admonished:
We the people created the government and gave it its powers. And our
love of liberty and our spiritual strength, our dedication to the
Constitution, are what, in the end, preserves our great nation and this great
hope for all mankind. All of us, as Americans, are joined in the great
common enterprise to write the story of freedom—the greatest adventure
mankind has ever known and one we must pass on to our children and
their children—remembering that freedom is never more than one
generation away from extinction.307

302. See supra note 268 and accompanying text (observing that the "true corrective of
abuses of Constitutional power" requires the people to censor the government through the
elective process).
303. BARTON, supra note 264, at 284.
304. See supra notes 275–76 and accompanying text (observing that the purpose of
government is to secure to citizens their rights and to allocate to leaders the power to ensure
that government fulfills its proper function).
305. See supra notes 277–78 and accompanying text (noting the tendency of human
nature to grasp at power, necessitating the implementation of internal safeguards to
counteract the predisposition of leaders to abuse their power and to oppress those over whom
they preside).
306. See Graves v. New York ex rel. O’Keefe, 306 U.S. 446, 491 (1939) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring) ("The ultimate touchstone of constitutionality is the Constitution itself . . . .");
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 179–80 (1803) ("[I]t is apparent, that the framers of
the constitution contemplated that instrument, as a rule for the government of courts, as well as of
the legislature . . . . [I]n declaring what shall be the supreme law of the land, the constitution itself
is first mentioned . . . ." (emphasis omitted)).
307. Reagan, supra note 300, at 97.
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In order for the separation of powers to weather the stormy seas ahead, it
is the people who must rise to the occasion—this is the age-old principle that
this Note advances as the surest safeguard against the deterioration of the
separation of powers and of America’s republic. In the same speech,
President Reagan declared:
The warning, more than a century ago, attributed to Daniel Webster,
remains as timeless as the document he revered. "Miracles do not
cluster," he said, "Hold on to the Constitution of the United States of
America and to the Republic for which it stands—what has happened
once in 6,000 years may never happen again. Hold on to your
Constitution, for if the American Constitution shall fall there will be
anarchy throughout the world."308

This Note echoes President Reagan’s words, sounding a call to the
American people to "hold on to [their] Constitution" during the times of
future crisis that might occasion hasty governmental innovation that
disregards the separation of powers principle.309
Upon exiting the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia, a woman
inquired of Benjamin Franklin, "Well Doctor what have we got a republic or
a monarchy?" In his characteristic wisdom, Franklin responded, "A republic
if you can keep it."310

308. Id.
309. Id.
310. 3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 85 (Max Farrand ed., 1966).

